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TEXTUALISM AND JURISDICTION
ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to test textualists’ central claims—that their approach is most consistent with 
the faithful-agent conception of the judicial role in statutory interpretation and more likely to constrain 
judges’ capacity to do mischief under the guise of statutory interpretation—by critically examining the 
manner in which textualists have interpreted jurisdictional statutes.  In addition, it considers descriptive 
and normative implications of textualists’ treatment of jurisdictional statutes for the long-standing debate 
about the extent of Congress’s authority to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts. If textualist 
judges are supposed to act as a faithful agents of Congress, following the plain meaning of statutory text, 
then when Congress confers jurisdiction without qualification, we would expect textualist judges to 
eschew arguments for implicit exceptions to the exercise of jurisdiction.  In practice, however, although 
the Court’s textualists have strictly read statutes that purport to divest the federal courts of jurisdiction, 
they have not been as consistent in relying on the plain language of statutes that appear to confer 
expansive grants of jurisdiction.  The Court’s textualists’ treatment of jurisdictional statutes suggests that 
the textualists’ urge to constrain judicial power has sometimes trumped their competing demand that 
courts act as faithful agents of Congress by considering only the plain meaning of statutory language.  
This has implications for both textualism and the larger question of the proper relationship between 
Congress and the courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime, and should force textualists to defend their 
approach more explicitly as a device for constraining judicial authority.  
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CONCLUSION  
“[Federal courts] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the 
constitution.”  
-Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.)
INTRODUCTION
Congressional control over federal court jurisdiction is a hot topic once again.1  Last 
term, the Supreme Court invalidated Congress’s effort to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to 
entertain habeas petitions from aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay,2 and the House of 
Representatives has recently considered several bills that would strip all federal courts of 
jurisdiction to consider various controversial subjects.3 These congressional actions are the latest 
skirmishes in a long-standing battle over the proper relationship between Congress and the 
federal courts in matters of federal-court jurisdiction.  
                                                
1  See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-
Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 234-38 (2007) (hereinafter “Pfander, Federal Supremacy”); see also
Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to 
Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007); Laurence Claus, The One Court That Congress Cannot Take 
Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59 (2007). 
2  Boumediene v. Bush, __ S. Ct. __ (2008) (reviewing Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 
1005(e)(1) & (2), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742, to be codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1), and Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636, to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
2241(e)(1)). 
3  See Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (depriving federal courts of jurisdiction over 
suits concerning the acknowledgment by a state or federal government entity or officer of “God as the sovereign 
source of law, liberty, or government”); Marriage Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. (depriving federal 
courts of jurisdiction over questions pertaining to provisions of the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C, 
freeing states from an obligation to recognize same-sex marriages entered lawfully in other states); Sanctity of Life 
Act of 2005, H.R. 776, 109th Cong. (depriving federal courts of jurisdiction over claims challenging state and local 
laws that protect fetuses or regulate abortion); Pledge Protection Act, H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. (depriving federal 
courts of jurisdiction over claims involving the constitutionality of the pledge of allegiance).  The House passed the 
Pledge Protection Act on May 17, 2005, but the Senate did not take up the bill.  
3For a long time, the jurisdiction-stripping debate has remained largely academic because 
the Court has largely avoided it.  But as an academic debate, it has been quite heated, pitting 
proponents of the traditional view that Congress has virtually plenary power over the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts4 against proponents of various theories of mandatory jurisdiction, which if 
nothing else impose substantial limits on Congress’s power to deprive federal courts of 
jurisdiction over certain matters.5  The debate over the power of courts to decline to exercise 
jurisdiction that Congress ostensibly has conferred has been equally robust.  On one side are
advocates of the strong congressional-control view, which holds that the separation of powers 
and the notion of legislative supremacy prevent the courts from abstaining from the exercise of 
congressionally conferred jurisdiction.6 An opposing group of scholars argue that courts both 
traditionally have exercised, and ought to exercise, substantial discretion in matters of 
jurisdiction.7  The divergent views on the virtues and validity of jurisdiction-stripping and 
judicial abstention stem directly from competing visions of the appropriate relationship between 
Congress and the federal courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime.
                                                
4  See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 
(1982); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the 
Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1997); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power 
to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External 
Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900 (1982); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 
1001 (1965); see infra Part I.  Although the scholars in this camp have argued that Congress has essentially plenary 
authority, many of them have urged Congress to refrain from exercising its broad power.  See Bator, supra note 4, at 
1037–38; Gunther, supra note 4, at 909–10.
5  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 206, 229–30 (1985); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict 
Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L. J. 498, 504-13 (1974); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 
1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 66 (1981); see infra Part I.  Still others have offered something of a middle 
ground, developing a dialogic model for federal jurisdiction under which Congress and the courts engage in a 
lengthy conversation about the appropriate boundaries for the courts’ jurisdiction.  See Barry Friedman, A Different 
Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (hereinafter, 
“Friedman, A Different Dialogue”); cf. James E. Pfander Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case for 
a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 154–160 (1999) (hereinafter “Supplemental Jurisdiction”)
(arguing for role for judicial discretion in crafting a jurisdictional regime).
6  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE.
L.J. 71 (1974) (hereinafter, “Redish, Abstention”).
7  See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (hereinafter, “Shapiro, 
Jurisdiction and Discretion”).
4Since the debate over congressional control of federal jurisdiction last flared in full 
force,8 there has been a revolution in methodological approaches to statutory interpretation.  
Beginning in the mid-1980s, several prominent judges and scholars urged courts to accept 
textualism as the only proper methodology for interpreting statutes.9  Textualism posits that 
courts are bound by a statute’s plain meaning, and that consideration of legislative history, spirit, 
or purpose is inappropriate in attempting to discern statutory meaning.  
Like the debate over congressional control of federal court jurisdiction, the debate over 
textualism is largely about the courts’ relationship to Congress.  The textualist approach derives 
from various legal traditions.  On its surface, textualism echoes the “plain-meaning” school of 
interpretation that was dominant in the nineteenth century, but modern textualists have 
developed a much richer account of the judicial role in interpreting statutes.  Although textualists 
draw on legal realism’s insights about the fictions of collective intent or purpose, they envision a 
much narrower judicial role than did the legal realists.  Indeed, modern textualism is offered as a 
response to the perceived excesses of purposivism, which often appeared to be a simple guise for 
judges to produce results with which they personally agreed.  Accordingly, textualists defend 
their approach by arguing that it meaningfully constrains judges.10  Textualists insist that in 
interpreting statutes, courts should act as faithful agents of Congress, treating the language of the 
statute as the legislative instructions that they are bound to follow.11  Any other approach to 
interpretation, they assert, undermines the rule of law and legislative supremacy.  
Textualism might not be the dominant approach to statutory interpretation among 
academics or judges generally,12 but it appears that several justices—clearly Justice Scalia and 
Thomas, and perhaps Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Kennedy—on the Supreme 
                                                
8  Some of the most provocative thinking about Congress’s power over federal-court jurisdiction took place in the 
early- to mid-1980s, after Congress considered scores of proposals to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over 
various controversial issues.  See, e.g., Sager, supra note 5; Amar, supra note 5.
9  See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in 
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 14-37 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 61, 68 (1994)
10  See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (2006); Adrian 
Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 79 (2000); Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 
91 VA. L. REV. 451, 455 (2005).
11  See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–18 (2001); 
Molot, supra note 10, at 6–29.
12  See Molot, supra note 10, at 29.
5Court now consider themselves textualists.13  (I will employ the term “the Court’s textualists” to 
refer to these five Justices.)  More important, textualism has had a significant influence on both 
judicial decision-making and the on-going scholarly debate over the appropriate judicial role in 
statutory interpretation.  As a result, comparatively few judges and scholars now openly advance 
the strong purposivist approach to statutory interpretation that once prevailed.  In the aftermath 
of textualism’s rise, even non-textualists concede that they think more about text, proclaim their
waryiness of legislative history, and express sympathy to the call for constraints on the judicial 
role in statutory interpretation.14    
The influence of textualism on how jurists think about the courts’ relationship to 
Congress demands a reevaluation of the competing perspectives on the proper roles of Congress 
and the courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime.  In light of this influence, we would expect to 
see, at least as a positive matter, more strict interpretation of jurisdictional statutes, and a 
vindication, at least as a descriptive matter, for the strong congressional-control models.  After 
all, if the textualist judge is supposed to act as a faithful agent of Congress by following the plain 
meaning of statutory text, then when Congress plainly withdraws jurisdiction, faithfully 
                                                
13  Justice Scalia is a self-professed textualist, see Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 9, at 23-25, as is Justice 
Thomas, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007).  Justice Kennedy has given indications recently that 
he is inclined towards textualist approaches to statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Serv., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  It is somewhat less 
clear whether Justice Alito considers himself a textualist.  There are some indications that he does, see Confirmation 
Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be An Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 350 ( 2006) (“When I interpret 
statutes—and that’s something that I do with some frequency on the Court of Appeals—where I start and often 
where I end is with the text of the statute.  And if you do that, I think you eliminate a lot of problems involving 
legislative history and also with signing statements.”); Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (Alito, J.); Telltabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2516 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring); BP America Prod. Corp. v. 
Burton, 127 S. Ct. 638 (2006), but also some evidence that he does not; he joined Justice Souter’s arguably non-
textualist partial dissent in Limtiaco v. Camacho, 127 S. Ct. 1413 (2007), and in Zuni Public School District No. 89 
v. Department of Education, 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007), he declined to join Justice Scalia’s textualist dissent.  It is also 
unclear whether Justice Roberts considers himself a textualist, see, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of 
John Roberts to Be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 319-20 (2005) (stating some willingness to consider legislative history in certain 
circumstances), but in his short time on the bench he has generally joined opinions by the Court’s textualists, see, 
e.g., Zuni, 127 S. Ct. at 551 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J.); Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Serv., 
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007) (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.); Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.).  Some commentators have already concluded that Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito effectively are textualists.  See, e.g., John F. Duffy, In re Nuitjen: Patentable Subject Matter, 
Textualism and the Supreme Court, PATENTLY-O (2007), available at 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/DuffyOnNuijten.pdf (last visited August 13, 2007); Julia K. Stronks, Breyer v. 
Scalia: Will Alito Be an Activist or a Textualist?, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 15, 2006).
14  Molot, supra note 10, at 3–4.
6textualist judges can be expected to decline to exercise authority; and if Congress confers 
jurisdiction without qualification, then we would expect textualist judges—putting aside, for a 
moment, the any constraints imposed by judicial precedent or canons of construction—to eschew 
arguments for implicit exceptions to the exercise of jurisdiction.  Yet in practice, textualism’s 
impact on the relationship between Congress and the courts in crafting the jurisdictional regime 
has been more uneven.
To be sure, in recent years, textualists have often offered plain-meaning constructions of 
jurisdictional statutes.  But the Court’s textualist Justices have been considerably more willing to 
apply strict textualist approaches to jurisdictional statutes that limit, rather than expand, federal-
court jurisdiction.  For example, the Court’s textualist Justices have strictly construed the habeas 
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which limit the power of 
federal courts to entertain habeas petitions, even though for the twenty years preceding that 
statute’s enactment the Court had regularly announced extra-textual limitations on the courts’ 
habeas jurisdiction under the older habeas statute.  But textualism has not yet had a similarly 
profound impact on the judicial construction of jurisdictional statutes that by their terms do not 
admit of clear exceptions. The Court’s textualist Justices have continued to find extra-textual 
reasons to decline to exercise jurisdiction under those statutes.
Indeed, courts often interpret jurisdictional statutes based on something other than plain 
statutory language.  The diversity statute contains no exception for cases involving family law or 
probate, but the Court has excepted such cases from the statutory grant of jurisdiction.15  The 
federal question statute is almost identical to Article III’s grant of “arising under” jurisdiction, 
yet the Court has implied a well-pleaded complaint rule for the former but not for the latter.16  
And although that statute says nothing about abstention in certain classes of cases,17 the Court 
has departed from statutory text on several notable occasions in developing its abstention 
doctrines.18  
                                                
15  Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
16  Rivet v. Regents Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470 (1998).
17  Indeed, a different statute does, and that statute is limited to particular, congressionally defined categories of 
cases.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a 
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to 
protect or effectuate its judgments.”).
18  See, e.g., Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 
(1943); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 
7The rise of the “new textualism”19 has not had a significant impact on the interpretation 
of these statutes.  To be sure, many of the general grants of jurisdiction are old, and judicial 
interpretations are deeply ensconced in the jurisdictional regime; it is unrealistic to expect even a 
revolution in interpretive methodology to dislodge settled interpretations of statutory text, as the 
force of stare decisis is particularly strong in the context of statutory interpretation.20  In 
addition, there are other reasons—such as federalism and comity to state courts—why the Court 
has continued to decline to exercise jurisdiction that Congress appears to have granted in the 
plain text of its enactments.  But as it turns out, these reasons are at best only part of the 
explanation for why textualism has not fully vindicated the congressional-control model of 
federal jurisdiction.  
In practice, textualism’s application in the jurisdictional context has put its principal aims 
at war with each other.  Textualism’s proponents advance two principal claims in support of the 
approach.  First, they argue that the concepts of legislative supremacy and the faithful agency of 
courts to Congress require judges to give force only to the text of statutes, as opposed to other,
more malleable indications of legislative purpose.21  Second, they assert that this approach more 
effectively constrains the power of judges, which should be limited in a democratic society.22  As 
applied in most contexts, the textualists’ strict adherence to statutory text in determining 
statutory meaning effectuates both the specific goal of ensuring faithful agency and the more 
general goal of constraining judicial authority.  But in the context of jurisdictional statutes, being 
a faithful agent of Congress, as determined by plain statutory text, often requires an expansion 
of, rather than a limitation on, judicial power.  Read according to their plain text, most of the 
principal statutory jurisdictional grants would require the federal courts to assume jurisdiction in 
a much broader class of cases than they currently do under decidedly atextual readings of the 
statutes.  Textualism is largely about the properly limited judicial role in a democratic society, 
                                                                                                                                                            
800 (1976).  In announcing its abstention doctrines, the relevant jurisdiction-granting statute has usually been 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question statute.
19  William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
20  See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173 (1989).
21  Scalia, supra note 9, at 17 (“Men may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind 
us.”).
22  See, e.g., Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure, supra note 9, at 63 (“We are supposed to be faithful agents, 
not independent principals. Having a wide field to play—not only the statute but also the debates, not only the rules 
but also the values they advance, and so on—liberates judges. This is objectionable on grounds of democratic theory 
as well as on grounds of predictability.”); infra Part II.
8but being a truly faithful agent in the jurisdictional context would often require a less limited role 
for the courts than some textualists might otherwise prefer.  It turns out that the textualists’ urge 
to constrain judicial power has often trumped the textualists’ demand that courts act as faithful 
agents of Congress by considering only the plain meaning of statutory language in deciphering 
Congress’s instructions.  
My point is not that textualism’s somewhat erratic application in the context of 
jurisdictional statutes necessarily undermines textualism’s normative appeal.  There are powerful 
arguments—constitutional, institutional, and otherwise—for limiting judicial power, and the 
Court’s recent interpretations of jurisdictional statutes can be justified on these grounds.  But the 
account that I develop here does suggest that, contrary to textualists’ frequent claims, textualism 
in practice has sometimes been less about fidelity to Congress’s legislative supremacy and more 
about constraining judicial authority.  This may or may not be fatal for textualism, but it should 
force proponents of the approach to defend the theory more explicitly on those terms, rather than 
as a methodology for more accurately divining congressional intent.23  Equally important, the 
selective application of textualism suggests that the long-standing question about the proper 
relationship between Congress and the federal courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime is, in an 
era of the textualist ascendancy, a considerably more nuanced question than one might expect at 
first blush.
In Part I of this article, I provide a brief overview of the long-standing debate over the 
relationship between Congress and the courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime.  In Part II, I 
discuss textualists’ claims about statutory interpretation, focusing on the faithful-agent account 
of the judicial role and on textualists’ claims that their methodology better constrains judicial 
discretion.  In Part III, I canvass the current jurisdictional regime, focusing on when (and how) 
judicial interpretations of jurisdictional statutes follow plain statutory text, and when (and how) 
they depart from it.  Finally, in Part IV I address why the rise of textualism has not produced a 
markedly different judicial approach to construing expansive jurisdictional statutes, and what this 
state of affairs suggests more generally about both textualism and the broader debate about the 
relationship between Congress and the courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime.  I conclude by 
arguing that the Court’s selective application of textualism to limit federal-court jurisdiction 
                                                
23 Cf. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1475 (2007) (arguing that textualists accept various 
fictions about the legislative process in order to operationalize a theory of judicial restraint).
9suggests that, at least as a descriptive matter, the strong congressional-control models fail fully to 
capture the law governing federal-court jurisdiction.
I.  CRAFTING A JURISDICTIONAL REGIME:  CONGRESS AND THE COURTS
Academics have enthusiastically discussed the extent of Congress’s authority to control 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts at least since Henry Hart’s famous “Dialogue.”24  The debate 
has addressed both Congress’s power to strip the federal courts—either lower federal courts, the 
Supreme Court in its appellate capacity, or both—of jurisdiction and the federal courts’ authority 
to decline to exercise jurisdiction that Congress ostensibly has granted.  The literature on these 
questions is voluminous; I provide a brief overview below.  
A.  Congress’s Authority to Deprive the Federal Courts of Jurisdiction
The issue of jurisdiction-stripping—that is, of Congress’s power to divest the federal 
courts of jurisdiction over particular matters—actually embraces two separate, though related, 
questions:  Congress’s power over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, and Congress’s 
power to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  The traditional view is that 
Congress’s power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is plenary.  Article III, after 
all, leaves to Congress the decision whether to create lower federal courts in the first instance.25  
The records of the Constitutional Convention make clear that this provision was the product of a 
compromise between those who thought that federal courts were necessary for the vindication of 
federal rights and those who thought that state courts were adequate for all claims.26  The 
traditional argument is straightforward:  If, as Paul Bator argued, Congress is free to decide that 
there should be no lower federal courts at all, then Congress must have authority to create them 
while limiting their jurisdiction.27  
                                                
24  Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in 
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
25  U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1 (vesting the “judicial Power” in “one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); see Gunther, supra note 4, at 912.
26  See 1 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 124-25 (1937); Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. 
Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a 
New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 52-56 (1975).
27  Bator, supra note 4, at 1030-31.
10
The traditional view is thus based, at least in part, on the intuition that the greater power 
includes the lesser.28 It also relies on an argument—grounded in constitutional text, history, and 
structure—that if the question of access to the lower federal courts “should be left [as] a matter 
of political and legislative judgment,” then it makes no sense to conclude that Congress’s only 
authority is the “all-or-nothing power to decide whether none or all of the cases to which the 
federal judicial power extends need the haven of a lower federal court.”29  Proponents of the 
traditional view also point out that Congress, starting with the Judiciary Act of 1789, has 
consistently assumed that it has power to decide which controversies should be litigated in the 
first instance in the lower federal courts, and that the federal courts have generally endorsed this 
view.30  Advocates of the traditional view do not deny that there may be some constitutional 
limits on Congress’s power to strip the lower federal courts of jurisdiction, but they generally 
have contended that those limits do not inhere in Article III but instead should be inferred from 
other constitutional provisions.31
Under the conventional view, Congress’s power to limit the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction is similarly broad.  The “Exceptions Clause” of Article III provides that in most 
categories of cases within the judicial power, the Supreme Court “shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make.”32  Herbert Wechsler argued that this text compels the conclusion that 
“Congress has the power by enactment of a statute to strike at what it deems judicial excess by 
                                                
28  See Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A 
Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143, 145 (1982); But see Bator, supra note 4, at 1031 (disclaiming 
the greater-includes-the-lesser argument); Gunther, supra note 4, at 912 (same).
29  Bator, supra note 4, at 1031; accord Gunther, supra note 4, at 912 (“It is certainly difficult to argue that lower 
federal courts must be available to adjudicate federal claims when the explicit language of Article III, and the central 
point of the Constitutional Convention’s compromise, was to leave the establishment of lower federal tribunals to 
the discretion of Congress.”).  For a hyper-textualist defense of the traditional view, see Harrison, supra note 4, at 
209-50.
30  See Bator, supra note 4, at 1031-33; Gunther, supra note 4, at 913; e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441 (1850); 
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973).
31  Such “external” restraints—as opposed to “internal” restraints, which arguably are implied by Article III itself, 
see Gunther, supra note 4, at 900—would include a prohibition on federal laws limiting access to the lower federal 
courts on the basis of race.  See id. at 916; Bator, supra note 4, at 1034.  In addition, Martin Redish has argued that 
the Due Process Clause might require a federal forum in cases seeking judicial relief for the unlawful actions of 
federal officers, because the principle of Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871), and related cases makes the 
state courts unavailable in many such actions.  See Redish & Woods, supra note 26, at 49–52.
32  U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  
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delimitations of . . . the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.”33  Wechsler and other 
luminaries in the field of federal courts—including Paul Bator, Gerald Gunther, William Van 
Alstyne, and Martin Redish—have concluded, based on text,34 history,35 congressional 
practice,36 and judicial precedent,37 that Congress’s power under the Exceptions Clause is 
plenary.  Advocates of the traditional view of Congress’s power to limit the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction emphasize that although Congress’s power is broad, the power is subject to 
powerful political and practical limits, and that, generally speaking, Congress would be unwise 
to exercise the power.38  
Under the traditional view, therefore, Congress has considerable—if not unlimited—
power to deprive the lower federal courts of jurisdiction and to strip the Supreme Court of 
appellate jurisdiction.  Although this view of Congress’s power to control federal-court 
jurisdiction has attracted very prominent adherents over the years, it has been unable to generate 
consensus.  Henry Hart, for one, famously suggested that Congress lacked the power, under the 
Exceptions Clause, to “destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional 
plan.”39  Leonard Ratner elaborated on Hart’s “essential functions” thesis, and argued that 
Congress cannot deprive the Supreme Court of the ability “to maintain the supremacy and 
uniformity of federal law.”40  
Several other commentators have viewed the questions of congressional control over the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the lower federal courts together, concluding that 
                                                
33  Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1005.
34  Bator, supra note 4, at 1038.
35  Redish, An Internal and External Examination, supra note 4, at 908–11.
36  Gunther, supra note 4, at 906-07.
37  See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Part McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 233-62 (1973); 
Gunther, supra note 4, at 904-05.
38  See Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1006–07 (noting that “government cannot be run without the use of courts for the 
enforcement of coercive sanctions and within large areas it will be thought that federal tribunals are essential to 
administer federal law” and that a “jurisdictional withdrawal . . . might work to freeze the very doctrines that had 
prompted its enactment”); Bator, supra note 4, at 1041 (arguing that Congress should not enact laws stripping the 
Supreme Court of jurisdiction “not only because they represent bad policy but because they violate the structure and 
spirit of the instrument”); Gunther, supra note 4, at 909-12 (“Most of us would strongly prefer to have Congress 
express its disaffection with Court rulings by initiating constitutional amendments rather than by chopping off 
segments of the Court’s jurisdiction.  Invocations of the “exceptions” power would be unseemly and chaotic and 
might ultimately damages relations between the Court and the political branches that have worked reasonably well 
in our nation’s history.”).
39  Hart, supra note 24, at 1365.
40 Leonard Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court 
Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929, 957 (1982); Leonard Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960).
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Congress cannot infringe upon some mandatory core of federal jurisdiction.  Theodore 
Eisenberg, for example, argues that the Framers believed that there would be a federal forum for 
all cases within the federal judicial power.  Further, because Supreme Court review of all cases 
within the federal judicial power is simply not feasible anymore, Eisenberg asserts that it would 
be inconsistent with the constitutional role of the federal judiciary for Congress to abolish the 
lower federal courts today.41  Lawrence Sager asserts that the text, history, and logic of Article 
III require that there always be at least one Article III court available to review assertions of 
constitutional right,42 and that Congress lacks power selectively to deprive the federal courts of 
jurisdiction to review constitutional claims.43  Others have made similar claims based on original 
source materials, text, and structure.44  Finally, in a recent article, James Pfander argues that 
although Congress’s power to “constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme Court”45 permits 
Congress to vest exclusive jurisdiction in state courts over federal claims, the express inferiority 
requirement forbids Congress from entirely divesting the Supreme Court of power to review the 
judgments of state courts invoking that jurisdiction.46  These related theories of mandatory 
federal jurisdiction, in contrast to the traditional view, impose substantial limits on Congress’s 
power to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction.  On these views, albeit to different degrees, 
Congress’s power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts is largely allocative, rather than a 
license absolutely to curtail federal jurisdiction.  
                                                
41  Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 504–13.
42  Sager, supra note 5, at 66.
43  Id. at 68–77.  For a similar argument, see Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored 
Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 129, 141–46 (1981).
44  Relying on original source materials, Robert Clinton agreed that Congress is required to allocate to the federal 
judiciary every type of case listed in Article III.  Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court 
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984).  Clinton 
argued that there may be an exception for trivial cases, over which Congress need not confer jurisdiction on the 
federal courts.  See id. at 827–28, 839–40.  Akhil Amar offered a variation on this theme, arguing that constitutional 
text, history, and structure demonstrate that the Framers believed that some federal court would be available “to hear 
and resolve finally any given federal question, admiralty, or public ambassador case,”44 Amar, supra note 5, at 206, 
229–30; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 
(1990) (considering the Act as evidence of the Framers’ acceptance of the two-tiered view of federal jurisdiction),
the heads of jurisdiction for which Article III provides that the judicial power “shall extend to all Cases,” U.S.
CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).  Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson recently offered a theory of 
mandatory jurisdiction based on a similar reading of the text, and of other provisions of the Constitution.  See
Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 1.
45  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
46  Pfander, Federal Supremacy, supra note 1; see also Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 1; Laurence Claus, The One 
Court That Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59 (2007).
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At bottom, the debate over Congress’s power to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction 
is a question of the proper relationship between Congress and the federal courts.  The more one 
is committed to the notion of legislative supremacy, the more one is likely to accept the 
traditional, congressional-control view.  Below I consider what the rise of textualism suggests 
about popular commitments to this notion; but first I provide a brief overview of the related 
debate over the courts’ authority to decline to exercise power that Congress has granted. 
B.  The Federal Courts’ Authority to Decline to Exercise Power That Congress Has 
Affirmatively Granted
A similar debate has raged over the extent of the federal courts’ power to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction that Congress has ostensibly granted.  This discourse reflects the same 
fundamental theme at issue in the controversy over Congress’s power to deprive the federal 
courts of jurisdiction: the degree to which Congress exercises control over the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.47  Martin Redish is the principal proponent of a strong congressional-control 
model, arguing that “neither total nor partial judge-made abstention is acceptable as a matter of 
legal process and separation of powers.”48  Although Redish concedes that the federal courts 
“have long assumed the authority to decline to exercise jurisdiction explicitly vested in them by 
Congress,”49 he argues that such actions amount to “blatant—and indefensible—usurpation[s] of 
legislative authority” that are inconsistent with democratic principles.50  According to Redish’s 
vision of the separation of powers, Congress creates jurisdiction, and the courts must exercise it 
consistent with Congress’s commands.51      
                                                
47  See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1234–35 (4th ed. 1996) (hereinafter, “HART AND WECHSLER’S”).
48  Redish, Abstention, supra note 6, at 74; accord MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL 
ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 47-74 (1991).
49  Redish, Abstention, supra note 6, at 71.  Redish addresses both conventional abstention doctrines, id. at 75-80, 
and more informal forms of abstention, such as the judicially fashioned probate- and domestic-relations exceptions 
to the diversity jurisdiction, id. at 102–04.  For a brief discussion of these doctrines, see infra at notes 270–290 and 
accompanying text.
50  Redish, Abstention, supra note 6, at 72–74; accord Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A 
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1964) (“[J]urisdiction under 
our system is rooted in Article III and congressional enactments” and “is not a domain solely within the Court’s 
keeping”) (hereinafter, “Gunther, Subtle Vices”).
51  See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (“We have no more right to 
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.  The one or the other would 
be treason to the Constitution.”); see also Gunther, Subtle Vices, supra note 50, at 12 (critiquing Alexander Bickel’s
reliance on the “passive virtues”).
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David Shapiro has responded by advancing a more robust role for the courts in crafting a 
jurisdictional regime.52  He argues that, as a descriptive matter, judicial discretion in matters of 
jurisdiction “is much more pervasive than is generally realized.”53  Indeed, such discretion, he 
argues, is “everywhere”54 and does not amount to judicial usurpation, as Redish charged, but 
rather is “wholly consistent with the Anglo-American legal tradition.”55  Shapiro’s normative 
defense goes beyond mere matters of tradition, though; he argues that judicial discretion in 
matters of jurisdiction actually strengthens the separation of powers, both horizontally (by 
helping to ease interbranch tensions)56 and vertically (by reducing friction with state courts and 
state governments).57  On this view, Congress does not lack authority to control the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts, but it must act clearly if it seeks to narrow the courts’ presumptive 
discretion in matters of jurisdiction.58  
The debates over the extent of Congress’s control over the federal courts’ jurisdiction 
ultimately cannot be resolved without careful consideration of the appropriate judicial role in our 
constitutional system.  Although there have been some attempts systematically to consider the 
courts’ institutional role vis-à-vis Congress in the jurisdictional context, scholars have generally 
told only part of that quite complicated story.59  As I explore in more detail below, theories of 
                                                
52  See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 7.
53  Id. at 545.
54 Barry Friedman, Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Retrospective: Most Influential Articles—David L. Shapiro, 
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2000).
55  Shapiro Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 7, at 545.
56  Id. at 585-87; see also See Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term – Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 
75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1891, 1893 (2004) (hereinafter, “Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited”); cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, The 
Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 396 (critiquing view that Congress can resolve up 
front all difficult questions likely to arise in litigation) (hereinafter, “Meltzer, Judicial Passivity”).
57  Shapiro Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 7, at 580–85.  Barry Friedman has advanced a variation on 
Shapiro’s position, arguing that boundaries of federal jurisdiction evolve—and properly evolve—“through a dialogic 
process of congressional enactment and judicial response.”  Friedman, A Different Dialogue supra note 5, at 2.
58  David L. Shapiro, Reflections on the Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: A Response to 
“Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1845 
(1992).
59  See Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Why the Debate Over Congress’ Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1312 (1984) (“[T]he positions that scholars take on the specific 
issue of congressional power to restrict jurisdiction frequently are bound up with the scholars’ more general views of 
the Constitution’s structure” and the nature of judicial review); Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional 
Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts—Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J.
2445, 2448 (1998) (describing three “conflicting narrative” of the relationship between Congress and the courts that 
emerged from the jurisdiction- and remedy-stripping of the mid-1990s); cf. Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial 
Power in a “Unified Judiciary,” 78 TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2000) (arguing that the various attributes of judicial 
power fall into three “allocative categories,” and that Congress has varying power to allocate these attributes among 
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statutory interpretation are in large part about the relationship between Congress and the courts.  
To develop a richer account of Congress’s authority over matters of federal court jurisdiction, 
therefore, it is a useful endeavor to consider the interpretive methodology that the courts use in 
construing statutes governing jurisdictional matters.  
Both fronts in the battle over congressional control of federal jurisdiction, jurisdiction-
stripping and judicial abstention, last raged in full force in the early- to mid-1980s, shortly before 
the ascendancy of textualism.  Since then, the rise of textualism has redefined the debate about 
the courts’ role in interpreting statutes.  Yet the war about the appropriate judicial role in crafting 
a jurisdictional regime has been waged without attention to the changes that textualism has 
worked in the debate over the judicial role.  In light of the textualist revolution, it is time to 
update the discussion of the respective roles of Congress and the courts in crafting a 
jurisdictional regime.  
II.  TEXTUALISM AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE
For much of the twentieth century, the conventional approaches to statutory interpretation 
required a court to determine either what the legislature intended in enacting the relevant statute 
or what the animating purposes of that statute were.  Because under the former approach, 
generally known as “intentionalism,” legislative intent was the touchstone of statutory 
interpretation, judges generally considered any source that shed light on the legislature’s intent.60  
Under the latter approach, generally known as “purposivism,” and exemplified by the Hart and 
Sacks “legal process” school, courts read statutory language in light of the (often unarticulated) 
purposes that animated the statute.61  Obviously, in pursuit of the goals of these inquiries, 
                                                                                                                                                            
the federal courts); James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of 
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 884 (1998) (arguing that there are five 
qualities constituting the “judicial Power,” and that they are the principal means for keeping federal law supreme 
over contrary state law in cases in which Congress confers jurisdiction); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction Stripping 
and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1435 (2000) (arguing that 
“the constitutional requirement of ‘supremacy’ may leave Congress free to fashion exceptions and regulations to the 
Court’s as-of-right appellate jurisdiction, but limit its ability to couple such regulations with restrictions on the 
Court’s supervisory role that would threaten the constitutional requirement of lower federal court ‘inferiority’ to the 
one ‘supreme’ court specified in Article III.”).
60  See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 19, at 626-40.
61  See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also T. Alexander 
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statutory language was important and often decisive for both intentionalists and purposivists,62
but it was not the sole focus of the interpretive inquiry.  Under either approach, it was possible in 
theory for some source, such as legislative history or apparent spirit or purpose, to trump the 
statutory text, and this occasionally occurred in practice.63  Intentionalism and purposivism 
proceeded from the premise of legislative supremacy:  If, in a constitutional democracy, judges 
must be faithful agents of Congress, then judges must attempt to decipher as accurately as 
possible Congress’s statutory instructions.64  
Textualism, in contrast, is an approach to statutory interpretation that accords dispositive 
weight to the meaning of the statutory text.  It maintains that in interpreting statutes, courts must 
“seek and abide by the public meaning of the enacted text, understood in context.”65  The 
approach is thus closely identified with Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous claim that “[w]e do not 
inquire into what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”66  Justice Scalia, 
the leading modern proponent of textualism, has explained that the touchstone for the modern 
textualist’s inquiry is “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would 
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”67  Because 
the meaning of the text, rather than Congress’s subjective intent in enacting the statute, is the 
proper focus, textualist judges generally refuse to treat legislative history as an authoritative 
                                                                                                                                                            
Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 26–28 (1988) (associating legal process 
approach with intentionalist theories of statutory interpretation).
62  See, e.g., United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (“In the interpretation of statutes, the 
function of the courts is easily stated.  It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.”); 
HART & SACKS, supra note 61, at 1374-80 (arguing that a court should “[i]nterpret the words of the statute . . .so as 
to carry out the purpose as best it can, making sure, however, that it does not give the words . . . a meaning they will 
not bear”).
63  See, e.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922) (“We may... look to the reason of the enactment and 
inquire into its antecedent history and give it effect in accordance with its design and purpose, sacrificing, if 
necessary, the literal meaning in order that the purpose may not fail.”); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 
143 U.S. 457 (1892); Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 19, at 628 & n. 25 (“In a significant number of cases, 
the Court has pretty much admitted that it was displacing plain meaning with apparent legislative intent or purpose 
gleaned from legislative history”; collecting cases).
64  See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 321, 325–39 (1990).
65  John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005) (hereinafter “Manning, 
Legislative Intent”).
66  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L .REV. 417, 419 (1899).
67  Scalia, supra note 9, at 17.
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indication of legislative intent.68  For the same reason, textualists will not elevate the purposes or 
spirit of a statute over its text.69
Like intentionalism and purposivism, textualism is premised on the notion of legislative 
supremacy, and on the corollary that the courts must act, in a constitutional democracy, as the 
faithful agents of the legislature.70  Textualists depart from intentionalists and purposivists, 
however, in their views of the legislative process, the notion of legislative intent, and the 
judiciary’s relationship to Congress.71  First, textualists have relied on the insights of public 
choice theory in arguing that because many statutes simply reflect bargains struck among interest 
groups competing for favorable treatment, departure from the statutory text threatens to disturb 
the legislative compromise.72  Second, textualists draw on social choice theory73 and legal 
realism74 in arguing that the concept of a collective, unexpressed legislative intent is illusory.  
Together, these insights suggest that Congress has no single, identifiable intent, and that statutes 
have no single, identifiable purpose.75  Third, textualists argue that the Constitution’s 
institutional structure has implications for the judicial role in statutory interpretation.  Only the 
text of statute, not its legislative history or underlying purposes, is enacted into law with the 
requisite participation by both Houses of Congress and the President.  Accordingly, to elevate 
                                                
68  See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Non-Delegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 684-89 (1997)
(hereinafter, “Manning, Non-Delegation”).
69 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 9, at 23; Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 65, at 420.
70  See Scalia, supra note 9, at 17, 22; John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 15-21 (2001); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 371-72 (2005) (hereinafter “Nelson, 
What is Textualism”).
71  In focusing on textualism and intentionalism here, I do not mean to suggest that there are no other approaches to 
statutory interpretation.  Instead, I discuss intentionalism to provide a richer account of textualism, which responded 
largely to intentionalist approaches.  For other approaches to statutory interpretation, see, e.g., WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 116–18 (1994) (discussing doctrine of  “the equity of the 
statute”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 267–87 (1985) (discussing “imaginative 
reconstruction” of statutes); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 7 (1982) (arguing for a 
common-law function  of courts to “see[] to it that the law is kept up to date”).
72  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 46 (1984); Frank 
H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (hereinafter “Easterbook, Statutes’ 
Domains”); see generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group 
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975).
73  See Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure, supra note 9, at 68; Kenneth Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” not 
an “It”; Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).  For social choice theory, see 
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2–4 (2d ed. 1963).
74  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 372 (1990); Eskridge, New 
Textualism, supra note 19, at 642–43; Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure, supra note 9, at 68.  For the classic 
statement of the legal realists’ view of legislative intent, see Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 
863 (1930).
75  See Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 72, at 536; Molot, supra note 10, at 25.
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legislative history or unexpressed statutory purpose over statutory language ignores the 
constitutionally prescribed procedures for lawmaking and impermissibly aggrandizes the courts’ 
role.76  Textualists’ refusal to treat legislative history as authoritative evidence of legislative 
intent77 or to elevate the spirit of a law over its letter78 flow naturally from these theoretical 
premises.79  
Modern textualism arose in large part as a response to the perceived excesses of 
intentionalism and purposivism, and to the perceived activism of the Court in matters of statutory 
interpretation.80   But textualism is not merely reactive; its proponents have offered a coherent 
approach with strong theoretical bases.  Textualists have argued that only their approach is 
ultimately consistent with the notion of faithful agency, with legislative supremacy, and the rule 
of law itself.  Justice Scalia, for example, has argued that “it is simply incompatible with 
democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law 
determined by what the lawmaker meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.”81  On 
this view, reliance on sources other than statutory text is “tyrannical,” because it “is the law that 
governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”82
But the core of textualism’s normative appeal lies in its claims about the judicial role and 
the dangers of judicial law-making.83  As Justice Scalia explained, “being bound by genuine but 
unexpressed legislative intent rather than the law is only the theoretical threat” of non-textualist 
approaches to statutory interpretation; the “practical,” and more immediate, threat is that “under 
                                                
76  See, e.g, Scalia, supra note 9, at 17–18, 21–22; Manning, Non-Delegation Doctrine, supra note 68, at 695–99; 
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure, supra note 9, at 63.
77  Scalia, supra note 9, at 29–36; Manning, Non-Delegation Doctrine, supra note 68 at 684–90.
78  Scalia, supra note 9, at 17–23; Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 65, at 420.
79  See Scalia, supra note 9, at 17 (“Men may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind 
us.”).
80  See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists and Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 76 (2006) 
(hereinafter “Manning, Textualists and Purposivists”) (“[T]extualism originated in reaction to the Court’s 
traditional (and perhaps anachronistic) understanding of purposivism.”); Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor 
Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451, 455 (2005); Molot, supra note 10, at 25; Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and 
Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1025–32 (1998).  For arguments that theories of 
statutory interpretation are cyclical, see Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
149 (2001); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 799 (1985); cf. Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
2004, at 149, 149 (“When the ideological valence of Supreme Court decisions shifts, constitutional theorizing about 
judicial review tends to shift as well.”).
81  Scalia, supra note 9 at 17.
82  Id.
83  See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2388, 2435 (2003) (describing the “rule-of-law 
objectives implicit in the Constitution’s strict separation of lawmaking from judging.”).
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the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law 
judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking 
proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.”84  In elevating statutory language over 
legislative history and statutory purposes by limiting the range of potentially ambiguous sources 
to which judges can properly refer, textualists hope to “constrain the tendency of judges to 
substitute their will for that of Congress.”85  Moreover, it is not simply the limited range of 
permissible sources for discerning statutory meaning that constrains textualist judges; as Caleb 
Nelson recently argued, “textualism can be seen as a more rule-based method of ascertaining 
what the enacting legislature probably meant,”86 harnessing the constraining power of rules 
while evading the discretion-conferring qualities of standards.87
Of course, there is a lively debate over whether textualism is more successful than other 
approaches to statutory interpretation at constraining judicial willfulness,88 and over whether 
                                                
84  Scalia, supra note 9, at 17–18; see id. at 18 (calling “legislative intent” a “handy cover for judicial intent”); id. at 
21 (calling purposivism “an invitation to judicial lawmaking”).  
85  Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 19, at 674; accord William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism: The Unknown 
Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1528–31 (1998) (hereinafter “Eskridge, Unknown Ideal”) (“According to the new 
textualists, consideration of legislative history creates greater opportunities for the exercise of judicial discretion.”); 
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 72, at 551 (“[E]ven the best intentioned [judges] will find that the 
imagined dialogues of departed legislators have much in common with their own conceptions of the good.”); Molot, 
supra note 10, at 26; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1989) 
(“[W]hen one does not have a solid textual anchor . . . form which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement 
appears uncomfortably like legislation.”); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: And 
Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1086–87 (1992) (“Textualists argue that the potentially wide array of 
originalist sources (especially legislative history) gives judges the freedom to justify (and hide) any policy 
decision.”); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding 
Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1309-10 (1990) (“The Textualist fears that with this wealth 
of materials a court sift through the legislative history to reach results-oriented decisions.”).
86  Nelson, What Is Textualism, supra note 70 at 377.  Nelson relies on textualists’ rule-like stances with respect to 
legislative history, id. at 377, drafting errors, id. at 377–83, and canons of construction, id. at 383–98, and their 
willingness to embrace rule-like directives from Congress, id. at 398–403.  See also id. at 98 (“[P]art of what drives 
textualists toward rules in the first place is their skepticism about judges’ abilities to apply an underlying 
justification consistently from case to case.”); Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 72, at 536 (“[U]nless  . . . 
the community is willing to entrust almost boundless discretion to judges as oracles of the community’s standards[,] 
there is a need for some broader set of rules about when to engage in the open-ended process of construction.”).  
87  See Nelson, What is Textualism, supra note 70, at 374–75; see generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE 
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 51–52 (1991); 
Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword:  The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
88  Molot, supra note 10, at 48–50 (“[A]s textualist scholars and judges begin to believe that textualist tools can be 
employed not just to resolve statutory ambiguity, but also to eliminate it, the opportunities for judicial creativity and 
abuse increase dramatically.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to 
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative States, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 779–780 (1995) (suggesting that 
Court’s textualist approach might be influenced by the “ideological composition of the Executive and Judicial 
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textualism is more likely to effectuate the faithful agent theory of the judicial role in statutory 
interpretation.89  Recent commentators, moreover, have argued that textualism and 
intentionalism in practice might not be as different as textualist critics maintain90—or at least that 
they might not be different for the reasons that textualists claim.91  In any event, textualism has 
had an undeniably powerful impact on both legal scholarship and judicial decision-making.
Just ten years ago, Justice Scalia lamented that legal scholarship “has been seemingly 
agnostic as to whether there is even any such thing as good or bad rules of statutory 
interpretation,” and that there “are few law-school courses on the subject, and certainly no 
required ones.”92  Today, in contrast, classes in statutory interpretation or legislation are 
commonplace at law schools, and many top programs have required first-year students to take a 
course that focuses on the positivization of law in the regulatory state.93  The rise of textualism is 
in part responsible for these changes.  To be sure, textualism remains somewhat unfashionable in 
academic circles—which, William Eskridge has noted, tend to be “a haven for the contextually 
                                                                                                                                                            
Branches”); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (1998) 
(“[W]e might conclude that the failure to consult legislative history is actually the more activist move, for it gives 
the judge more power to shape the policy objectives of the statute unilaterally, unconstrained by policy priorities or 
goals that may have been expressed by legislators. Indeed, from the standpoint of judicial activism concerns, there is 
something perverse about a rule that would license judges to invoke policy considerations of their own making, 
secondary sources, and canons of construction, yet prohibit them from distilling and considering what relevant 
policy concerns may appear in the deliberative record generated by the legislators who drafted and debated the 
bill.”); Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 85, at 1522 (noting that the “debating history of federal statutes, most 
of which were enacted by Democratic Congresses,” is slanted “in a more regulatory-state direction,” and that 
textualism’s approach to legislative history might be a “politically conservative move by courts”); cf. Nelson, What 
Is Textualism, supra note 70, at 373 (“[T]oday’s textualists tend to be politically conservative, and the complex of 
attitudes that they draw upon in resolving close cases may well color what we think of as ‘textualism.’”); Martin H. 
Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism 
in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 819 (1994) (“[N]ew textualism effectively opens the door to 
seemingly unlimited judicial interpretive discretion every time an ambiguity is found to exist.”).
89  Molot, supra note 10, at 53 (“[A]ggressive textualism tends to enhance the judiciary’s role vis-à-vis Congress.  
The creativity that aggressive textualism fosters in judges makes them look less like faithful agents of Congress and 
more like coequal partners.”); Schacter, supra note 88, at 39 (“[A] judicial decision to categorically disregard 
legislative history is, after all, a judicial decision about who decides what is relevant to statutory meaning, and is, in 
that sense, difficult to reconcile with a strong conception of judicial restraint.”); Redish & Chung, supra note 88, at 
806 (“By generally confining an interpreting judge to text, new textualism leaves an interpreter without guidance in 
the numerous cases when the application of text to a specific fact situation is ambiguous or unclear.”).
90 Molot, supra note 10, at 3–4.  But see Manning, Textualists and Purposivists, supra note 80, at 91–109.
91  Nelson, What Is Textualism, supra note 70, at 348–51.  But see Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 65, at 
423–24.
92  Scalia, COMMON-LAW COURTS, supra note 9, at 14–15.
93 Harvard Law School, for example, now requires first-year students to take a course in Legislation and Regulation, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/admissions/jd/about/curriculum/ (last visited June 25, 2007), and Columbia offers a 
similar class as an elective to first-year students, http://www.law.columbia.edu/jd_applicants/curriculum/1l (last 
visited July 22, 2008).  These courses typically provide a heavy dose of textualism, among other approaches.
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inclined”94—and it is probably not the dominant approach to statutory interpretation among 
judges generally.95  But there are indications that several—and perhaps even a majority of—
Justices on the United States Supreme Court now consider themselves textualists.96  More 
important, the ranks of textualists surely have grown since the theory’s emergence in the 1980s, 
and textualism has undoubtedly had a profound influence on both judicial decision-making and 
the on-going scholarly debate over the appropriate judicial role in statutory interpretation.  
Textualism has shaped the way in which even non-textualist Justices on the Supreme Court write 
their opinions, and very few judges and scholars today advance the strong purposivist approach 
to statutory interpretation that once dominated in the academy.97  As Jon Molot has argued, 
textualism “seems to have been so successful . . . that [now] we are all textualists in an important 
sense.”98
In this article, I focus on the textualists’ two principal claims: (1) that their approach is 
most consistent with the faithful-agent conception of the judicial role in statutory interpretation; 
and (2) that their approach is more likely to constrain the capacity of judges to do mischief under 
the guise of statutory interpretation.  In the sections that follow, I seek to test these claims by 
considering the manner in which textualists have interpreted jurisdictional statutes.  I then draw 
upon both the descriptive and normative implications of the textualists’ treatment of 
jurisdictional statutes in order to update the long-standing debate about the extent of Congress’s 
authority to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  
III.  THE CURRENT FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL REGIME
If the congressional-control model of federal court jurisdiction were entirely accurate as a 
positive matter, then, in matters of federal jurisdiction, that Congress would legislate the proper 
boundaries of judicial cognizance and the courts would respond by faithfully following 
                                                
94  Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 85 , at 1513.
95  Molot, supra note 10, at 29.
96  See supra note 13.
97  Non-textualist judges, for example, are considerably more likely today to cite dictionary meanings—a common 
tool of the trade for textualists, see Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: 
Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 873, 893 (2008)—in the course of statutory 
interpretation.  See, e.g., Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1586 (2008) (Breyer, J.).
98  Molot, supra note 10, at 43; Siegel, supra note 80, at 1057.
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Congress’s mandates—regardless of whether Congress restricts or enlarges99 the courts’ 
jurisdiction.  However, the actual law of federal jurisdiction is a confusing blend of statutes and 
judicial decisions, some of which purport to interpret statutes and others of which appear to be 
tantamount to common-law decisions.  In some contexts, Congress has led and the courts have 
followed;100 in others, the courts have led, and Congress has followed;101 in still others, the 
courts have acted without any congressional involvement.102  In many cases, although the 
jurisdictional statutes are brief and straightforward, court-made jurisdictional doctrine is complex 
and based upon something other than plain text.103   
With the ascendancy of textualism, one might expect this pattern to change.  As faithful 
agents of Congress, with the principal’s instructions embodied in the plain text of its enactments, 
courts applying a textualist approach to jurisdictional questions presumably should treat the plain 
language of jurisdictional statutes as dispositive in deciding matters of federal jurisdiction.  The 
normative force of the textualist critique, after all, derives from its assertion about the 
“uncomfortable relationship of common-law lawmaking to democracy,” a problem that is 
particularly acute in the statutory context.104  Perhaps, therefore, we would expect a textualist 
judge to decline to find implicit exceptions to a statute that plainly provides, for example, that the 
district court “shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions” arising under federal law.105
Yet this has not exactly been the case.  Instead, the Court’s textualist Justices have 
frequently interpreted jurisdictional statutes according to something other than the plain meaning 
of their statutory text.  This is not to say that those Justices have consistently interpreted 
                                                
99  Assuming, of course, no constitutional limits on Congress’s power to do so.  See, e.g, Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (declaring unconstitutional provision of Judiciary Act of 1789 purporting to expand 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond that defined in Article III).
100  For example, Congress statutorily established an amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity cases, and the 
courts have developed a complicated set of rules to implement the requirement. 
101  For interpretive problems that arise when Congress enacts statutory reforms that parallel judicial 
reinterpretations of existing laws, see Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The 
Pathologies of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (1997).
102  See generally Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 7 .
103  Again, consider the aggregation rules that the courts have developed to determine whether the amount-in-
controversy requirement is satisfied in a diversity case.  See Friedenthal, Kane & Miller, Civil Procedure § 2.9 (4th
ed. 2005).
104  Scalia, COMMON-LAW COURTS, supra note 9, at 10; see id. at 17-18 (criticizing intentionalism because of the 
threat that “common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking 
proclivities from the common law to the statutory field”).
105  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (emphasis added).
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jurisdictional statutes atextually; to the contrary, there are many recent cases in which the 
Court’s textualists have appeared to apply a rigidly textualist approach to jurisdictional statutes.  
But in recent years the Court’s textualist Justices have consistently tended to construe 
jurisdictional statutes in a textualist fashion only when the statutes restrict, rather than expand, 
federal-court jurisdiction.  
In other words, the Court has continued, and perhaps accelerated, a project of narrowing 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts that it began about 35 years ago.  The Court has carried out 
this project through its construction of jurisdictional statutes, and also by elaborating on 
doctrines, such as standing106 or state sovereign immunity,107 that are grounded in Article III or 
other constitutional provisions.  As Judith Resnik has argued,108 there also are explicit 
indications, wholly aside from the Court’s formal decision-making, of the Court’s desire in 
recent years to limit federal-court jurisdiction, such as the Judicial Conference’s Long Range 
Plan for the Federal Courts109 and the Chief Justice’s annual report in 1997.110    Contrary to the 
concern of many commentators in the early 1980s, “in both case law and commentary, the 
federal judiciary has recently warned Congress to be wary of giving jurisdiction to federal judges 
and has said nothing to signal concern about the prospect of taking away federal jurisdiction.”111  
Louise Weinberg has echoed this concern, arguing that the debate about congressional 
control over federal court jurisdiction ignores “the reality that it is the Supreme Court rather than 
Congress that is the more active agent in denials of access to courts.”112  Professor Weinberg
suggests that the Court’s move to limit federal court jurisdiction reflects hostility to plaintiffs, 
                                                
106  See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 127 
S. Ct. 2553 (2007); cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1464–71 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
107  See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Idaho v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S.  
261 (1997). 
108  Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered 
Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2626–27 (1998) (“In the 1990s . . . federal judges are more often than not 
commanding (doctrinally) and recommending (in their commentary) that their jurisdiction over federal rights be 
curtailed.”).  
109  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (as approved by 
the Judicial Conference, Dec. 1995), reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49 (1995) (arguing for limits on federal jurisdiction, 
for no new “federalization of crime,” and for the creation of fewer new causes of action).  
110  William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, reprinted at 30 THIRD BRANCH, at 1 
(Jan. 1998). 
111  Resnik, supra note 108, at 2622–23.
112  Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of “Congress” to Attack the “Jurisdiction” of “Federal 
Courts,” 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1406–07 (2000).
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litigation, and courts themselves, amounting to a form of “judicial self-loathing.”113  One need 
not be as cynical as Professor Weinberg about the Court’s motivation to conclude that the 
unmistakable trend in recent years has been towards judicially self-imposed limits on federal 
jurisdiction.  
The Court has pursued this project aggressively and notwithstanding the rise of 
textualism.  This project and textualism are in harmony when Congress purports to oust the
federal courts of jurisdiction or to impose express limits on the federal courts’ jurisdiction.  But 
textualism’s focus on plain statutory text and the project to limit federal jurisdiction are in 
serious tension when Congress ostensibly—that is, on the face of its enactments— confers
expansive jurisdiction.  The sections that follow demonstrate that although the Court’s textualists 
have consistently applied a textualist approach to jurisdiction-ousting statutes, they have not 
done so when interpreting statutes that appear to grant jurisdiction without exception.114  As I 
explain in Part IV, when faced with this conflict between the desire to be faithful agents and the 
desire to limit judicial authority, textualists have often115 sacrificed the former in the name of 
advancing the latter.  
In this Part, I survey the Court’s treatment of the many jurisdictional statutes that 
operationalize Article III’s grant of the judicial power to the federal courts.  Because I am 
mindful of the perils of critiquing the decisions of a multi-member body, 116 and because it is 
important to understand the Justices’ individual approaches, I give as much attention to the 
expressed views of the Court’s self-professed textualists as I do to the Court’s actual decisions in 
cases in which the two differ.  I have limited my discussion to the Court’s decisions since the rise 
of textualism, treating Justice Scalia’s appointment to the Court in 1986 as a rough proxy for the 
beginning of textualism’s rise in importance.  Finally, by focusing on the views of the Court’s 
textualists, I do not mean to suggest that the Court’s non-textualist Justices have always 
                                                
113  Id. at 1421.
114  In Part IV, I argue that the best explanation for this selective application of textualism is that textualists have 
been more committed to textualism’s general project of limiting judicial authority than they have been to 
textualism’s insistence that judges act as faithful agents of Congress.  In that Part, I also conclude that other 
explanations cannot fully account for why the rise of textualism has only selectively resulted in interpretations of 
jurisdictional statutes that can fairly be said to be based strictly on textual considerations—and that if they are forced 
to bear a heavy burden in explaining the selective application of textualism, then textualists’ claims about faithful 
agency are substantially undermined.  See infra, Part IV.
115  But not always.   See supra, Part III.D.
116  See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).
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consistently applied their particular chosen approaches to statutory interpretation.  I focus on the 
textualists because the textualists, unlike the non-textualists, have insisted that only 
theirapproach is theoretically coherent and consistent with the faithful-agent conception of the 
judicial role.
A.  An Illustrative Recent Case: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld117
As an illustrative case, consider the Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which 
demonstrates the textualists’ approach selective approach to jurisdictional statutes.  The 
threshold question in Hamdan was whether the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)118
deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to consider the petitioner’s challenge to the system of 
military commissions established to adjudicate alleged offenses committed during hostilities in 
Afghanistan.  Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens, relied on “ordinary principles of statutory 
construction” in holding that the statute did not deprive it of jurisdiction.119  The Court noted that 
not “all jurisdiction-stripping provisions—or even all such provisions that truly lack retroactive 
effect—must apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment,” because “normal rules of 
construction, including a contextual reading of statutory language, may dictate otherwise.”120  
In concluding that the statute did not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction, the Court 
relied, among other things, on the statute’s legislative history.121  The Court chided Justice 
Scalia, who dissented on jurisdictional grounds, for facilely relying on the statute’s “plain 
meaning” when Congress had declined expressly to provide that the relevant subsection of the 
statute applied to pending cases, even while making just such express provision for the other 
                                                
117  126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
118  Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.  Section 1005(e)(1) provides: “No court, justice, or judge shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained 
by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”  Sections 1005(e)(2) and (3) vest exclusive jurisdiction in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review certain decisions.  Section 
1005(h)(1) provides that “[t]his section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act,” and 1005(h)(2) 
provides that “Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (e) shall apply with respect to any claim whose review is 
governed by one of such paragraphs and that is pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.”
119  126 S. Ct. at 2764.  
120  Id. at 2765.  The Court noted that in Republic of Austria v. Altmann , 541 U.S. 677 (2004), and Hughes Aircraft 
Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997), it “recognized that statutes ‘creating’ jurisdiction may 
have retroactive effect if they affect ‘substantive’ rights,” but argued that the Court had “applied the same analysis to 
statutes that have jurisdiction-stripping effect.”  Id. at 2768 n.12.
121  126 S. Ct. at 2766 n.10.
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subsections of the same provision.122  The Court rejected the government’s argument that the 
Court should abstain pursuant to the “judge-made rule that civilian courts should await the final 
outcome of on-going military proceedings before entertaining an attack on those proceedings.”123  
Relying on the congressional-control model of federal jurisdiction (at least with regard to
abstention) the Court found no reason for federal courts to “depart from their general ‘duty to 
exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress.’”124
Justice Scalia, the Court’s leading textualist, dissent joined by Justices Thomas and 
Alito.125  He asserted that the DTA’s plain text unambiguously deprived the courts of jurisdiction 
to consider Hamdan’s habeas petition.  According to Justice Scalia, an “ancient and unbroken 
line of authority attests that statutes ousting jurisdiction unambiguously apply to cases pending at 
their effective date,” and he argued that this “venerable rule” is not a “judge-made ‘presumption 
against jurisdiction.’”126  Instead, he argued that it is a simple recognition of the reality that “the 
plain import of a statute repealing jurisdiction is to eliminate the power to consider and render 
judgment—in an already pending case no less than in a case yet to be filed.”127  “To alter this 
plain meaning,” he insisted, “our cases have required an explicit reservation of pending cases in 
the jurisdiction-repealing statute.”128  In Justice Scalia’s view, straightforward textualism 
required this conclusion:  “[T]he cases granting such immediate effect are legion, and they 
repeatedly rely on the plain language of the jurisdictional repeal as an “inflexible trump” . . . by 
requiring an express reservation to save pending cases.”129  
Justice Scalia then criticized the majority for relying on the legislative history of the DTA 
“to buttress its implausible reading,” because “[w]e have repeatedly held that such reliance is 
impermissible where, as here, the statutory language is unambiguous.”130  In criticizing the 
Court’s reliance on legislative history, Justice Scalia advanced the classic textualist arguments 
for eschewing such reliance:  Legislative history was not enacted “through the constitutionally 
                                                
122  Id. at 2769.
123  Id. at 2769.
124  Id. at 2772 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins., Inc., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996)).
125  Chief Justice Roberts did not participate.
126  Id. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127  Id. at 2810–11.
128  Id. at 2811.
129  Id. at 2812 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2812 (criticizing Court for “[d]isregarding the plain meaning of § 
1005(e)(1)”).
130  Id. at 2815–17.
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prescribed method of putting language into a bill that a majority of both Houses vote for and the 
President signs”;131 and “[a]s always—but especially in the context of strident, partisan 
legislative conflict of the sort that characterized enactment of this legislation—the language of 
the statute that was actually passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President is 
our only authoritative and only reliable guidepost.”132
If Justice Scalia’s view about the meaning of the DTA evinced quintessential 
textualism—and seeming obeisance to the strong congressional-control model for federal 
jurisdiction—his fall-back argument suggested quite the opposite.  “Even if Congress had not 
clearly and constitutionally eliminated jurisdiction over this case,” he argued, “neither this Court 
nor the lower courts ought to exercise it.”133  Hamdan asserted jurisdiction under the federal 
habeas statute, which provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme 
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective 
jurisdictions.”134  Justice Scalia insisted that “[t]raditionally, equitable principles govern both the 
exercise of habeas jurisdiction and the granting of the injunctive relief sought by petitioner,”135
and he argued that, “[i]n light of Congress’s provision of an alternate avenue for petitioner’s 
claims . . ., those equitable principles counsel that we abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this 
case.”136  Such abstention, Justice Scalia argued, was warranted because of concerns of 
“interbranch comity.”137  
Justice Scalia’s approach is consistent with a pattern that has emerged since the 
ascendancy of textualism: The Court’s self-professed textualists advance strict, textually based 
interpretations of jurisdictional statutes that eliminate or limit federal court jurisdiction, to reach 
the conclusion that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over matters within the scope of those 
                                                
131  See id. at 2816–17 (“[T]he handful of floor statements that the Court treats as authoritative do not ‘reflec[t] any 
general agreement.’ They reflect the now-common tactic—which the Court once again rewards—of pursuing 
through floor-speech ipse dixit what could not be achieved through the constitutionally prescribed method of putting 
language into a bill that a majority of both Houses vote for and the President signs.”).
132  Id. at 2817; see also id. ((“[D]rafting history is no more legitimate or reliable an indicator of the objective 
meaning of a statute than any other form of legislative history.”).
133  126 S. Ct. at 2819 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134  28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).  
135  Id. at 2819–20; see also id. at 2821 n.9 (“The exercise of habeas jurisdiction has traditionally been entirely a 
matter of the court's equitable discretion . . . .”).
136  Id. at 2820.
137  Id. at 2822.
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statutes;138 at the same time they remain willing to offer wholly atextual interpretations of 
jurisdictional statutes that appear to grant more expansive jurisdiction, to reach the same 
conclusion.  The following sections substantiate this pattern.  I consider first the Court’s 
treatment of statutes that purport to deprive the courts of jurisdiction, or that purport to confer 
jurisdiction over only a limited class of cases. Then, I turn to the Court’s treatment of statutes 
that appear to confer expansive jurisdiction on the federal courts.  In each section, I use 
illustrative cases to demonstrate the basic approach of the Court’s textualist Justices.
B.  Textualist Interpretations of Statutes Limiting Lower Federal-Court Jurisdiction 
Justice Scalia’s approach in Hamdan is the rule, not the exception.  This is true not only 
for the textualists’ approach to construing the federal habeas statute in cases involving detainees 
in the war on terror, or habeas cases more generally, but also for other statutes that ostensibly 
deprive the lower federal courts of jurisdiction, or at least affirmatively purport to exclude some 
cases from those courts’ jurisdiction.  I address these categories of cases in turn.  
                                                
138  This trend has been quite pronounced recently.  Although the Court decided very few cases involving 
jurisdictional issues in the October 2007 term—the most important was Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008), 
but the question whether Congress had stripped the courts of jurisdiction was quite straightforward, and no member 
of the Court disagreed with the majority’s resolution of that question, id. at 2242–44—in the October 2006 term, the 
Court decided seven cases that involved claims that a lower federal court lacked jurisdiction to proceed.  In five of 
the cases, the Court held that the lower federal court lacked jurisdiction, generally relying on the plain meaning of an 
ostensibly jurisdiction-limiting provision of the relevant jurisdictional statute.  See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United 
States, 127 S. Ct. 1397 (2007) (Scalia, J.) (holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over relator’s claim in False 
Claims Act case because he was not “original source” within meaning of statute); Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 
(2007) (holding that district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain habeas petition because prisoner did not obtain 
authorization from the court of appeals to file a second or successive petition); Bowles v. Russell 127 S. Ct. 2360 
(2007) (holding that court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over appeal when district court extended time to appeal by 
more than 14 days permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), because statutory time limits are jurisdictional in nature); 
Powerex v. Reliant Energy Serv., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) prohibited appellate 
review of subject-matter-jurisdiction-based remand); Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) (holding that 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations for seeking federal habeas relief from a state-court judgment was not tolled during 
the pendency of a petition of for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court seeking review of the denial of state 
post-conviction relief).  In four of those five decisions, some or all of the Court’s non-textualist Justices dissented.  
See Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2421 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.); Lawrence, 127 S. Ct. at 1086 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.); Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1412 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.); Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2367 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer, JJ.).  And in one of the two cases in which the Court held that the lower court had jurisdiction, two of 
the Court’s textualists dissented.  See Osborn v. Haley, 127 S. Ct. 881 (2007) (holding that a district court’s order 
remanding to state court a suit against a federal employee was reviewable notwithstanding section 1447(d), which 
limits the reviewability of remand orders); id. at 906–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.)  (arguing that 
section 1447(d)’s plain terms should have controlled).
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In Rasul v. Bush,139 the Court held that the federal habeas statute conferred jurisdiction to 
hear challenges by aliens held at Guantanamo Bay.140  Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented.  The dissent relied upon the proposition that “[f]ederal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and that it “is to be presumed that a cause lies outside 
this limited jurisdiction.”141  He chastised the Court for ignoring the “words of [28 U.S.C.] § 
2241,” the habeas statute, which “presupposes a federal district court with territorial jurisdiction 
over the detainee.”142  
Scalia also argued that “Congress is in session,” and that “[i]f it wished to change federal 
judges’ habeas jurisdiction from what this Court had previously held that to be, it could have 
done so.”143 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Court’s other textualists, followed this 
approach in Rumsfeld v. Padilla,144 in which he held for the Court that the district court in which 
the respondent filed his habeas petition lacked jurisdiction over the custodian because it was not 
the district of confinement.  The Court relied on the “plain language of the habeas statute,”145 and 
argued that “it is surely just as necessary in important cases as in unimportant ones that courts 
take care not to exceed their ‘respective jurisdictions’ established by Congress.”146  
The textualists’ approach in Hamdan, Rasul, and Padilla cannot be explained simply by 
reference to the unusual status of the habeas petitioners in those cases.  Instead, the textualists’ 
approach in those cases is consistent with their general approach to congressional limitations on 
the federal courts’ habeas corpus jurisdiction, which I will discuss in detail below.147  First, 
                                                
139  542 U.S. 466 (2004).
140  Id. at 483.
141  Id. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142  Id. at 489; see also id. at 499–500 (arguing that the Court’s conclusion was “without a textual basis in the 
statute”).  Justice Scalia’s opinion was addressed mostly to precedent, but he did note that neither party had 
challenged “the atextual extension of the habeas statute to United States citizens held beyond the territorial 
jurisdictions of the United States courts.”  But he argued that “the possibility of one atextual exception thought to be 
required by the Constitution is no justification for abandoning the clear application of the text to a situation in which 
it raises no constitutional doubt.”  Id. at 497.
143  Id. at 506.
144  542 U.S. 426 (2004).
145  Id. at 435, 443.
146  Id. at 450–51.
147  The Court has at times suggested that the concept of jurisdiction in the habeas statute is distinct from the more 
common notion of subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434 n.7 (“using the  term “jurisdiction” “in 
the sense that it is used in the habeas statute, and not in the sense of subject-matter jurisdiction of the District 
Court.”); id. at 451–54 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that “the question of the proper location for a habeas 
petition is best understood as a question of personal jurisdiction or venue,” but declining to resolve the question); id. 
at 463 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he question of the proper forum to determine the legality of Padilla’s 
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however, a very brief history is in order.  In 1867, Congress granted the lower federal courts 
jurisdiction to review the claims of persons restrained under state law in violation of federal 
law.148  Until the 1950s, the Court construed the statute to permit review only of the question 
whether the committing court had jurisdiction over the petitioner.149  In the 1950s, however, the 
Court began to construe the statutory grant of jurisdiction expansively (and largely atextually).150  
Later, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts limited the reach of those decisions and erected other 
hurdles in the way of habeas petitioners.  However, just like the Warren Court decisions to which 
these later Courts reacted, such developments almost always occurred through a common-law 
process with little basis in the text of the statute or demonstrable congressional intent.151   
In 1996, Congress revised the statutory habeas regime when it enacted the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),152 which imposed limits—some 
incorporating existing judicial precedent, and others created by Congress—on the federal courts’ 
authority to entertain and grant habeas petitions.153  Unlike the Court’s pre-AEDPA decisions, 
which often made little effort to ground habeas doctrine in the language of the habeas statute, 
recent decisions construing AEDPA, particularly and perhaps unsurprisingly in opinions by the 
Court’s textualists, have relied more heavily on statutory language.154  In Tyler v. Cain,155 for 
example, Justice Thomas, speaking for the Court, narrowly interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 
2244(b)(2)(A), which creates an exception to AEDPA’s limitations on habeas jurisdiction for 
new constitutional rules that the Supreme Court has “made retroactive to cases on collateral 
review.”156   Justice Thomas insisted that the word “made” is synonymous with “held,” and that 
                                                                                                                                                            
incarceration is not one of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.”)).  But the Court has long held that the federal courts 
may exercise jurisdiction in habeas cases only to the extent that it is granted by Congress, see Ex parte Bollman, 8 
U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.); HART & WECHSLER’S, supra note 47, at 1286–87, and in so doing have 
treated the habeas statutes in the jurisdictional sense relevant to this project.
148  Act of February 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385. 
149  See, e.g., Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 441, 465-99 (1963); Friedman, A Different Dialogue, supra note 5, at 11.
150  See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 554 (1953); Friedman, A Different Dialogue, supra note 5, at 11; Barry 
Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 277 (1988).
151  See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465 (1976).
152  110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
153  See generally HART & WECHSLER’S, supra note 47, at 1288–89.
154  This is in part, of course, because Congress previously had offered little in the way of detailed statutory 
guidance.
155  533 U.S. 656 (2001).
156  28 U.S.C.§ 2244(b)(2)(A).
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the textual standard is not satisfied by the Court’s merely establishing principles of retroactivity 
to be applied by the lower courts.157  Justice Breyer’s dissent, in contrast, invoked the statute’s 
purpose, which, he argued, did not “favor[], let alone require[], the majority’s conclusion.”158  
Similarly, in Williams v. Taylor,159 the textualist-leaning Justices relied on dictionary definitions 
to justify a more narrow interpretation than that advanced by the dissenters of 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1), which limits the grounds upon which habeas may be granted.160 In Lawrence v. 
Florida,161 the textualist-leaning Justices relied on what “the text of the statute,” “[r]ead 
naturally,” “must mean”162 in concluding that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations for 
seeking federal habeas relief from a state-court judgment163 was not tolled during the pendency 
of a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court seeking review of the denial of 
state post-conviction relief.164  In construing AEDPA in this fashion, the Court’s textualist-
leaning Justices have made explicit their view that Congress controls the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, at least with respect to jurisdiction-ousting statutes.165
The Court’s textualists have not always prevailed in cases interpreting AEDPA, but when 
in dissent they—particularly Justices Scalia and Thomas—have consistently advanced 
arguments, based on statutory text, that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief.  In Stewart v. 
Martinez-Villareal,166 for example, the Court held that a prisoner’s competency-to-be-executed 
claim, which had been presented in a habeas application but had not been resolved because it 
                                                
157  533 U.S. at 662-64, 665-68.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice 
Thomas’s opinion.
158  Id. at 676.
159  529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (O’Connor, J.).
160  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (providing that a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted unless adjudication of the 
merits of the claim in state court “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see 529 U.S. at 405 
(O’Connor, J.) (praising court of appeals’ decision for “accurately reflect[ing] this textual meaning).  Although 
Justice Scalia joined Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court on this question, he declined to join a footnote to her 
opinion that relied on the statute’s legislative history.  See id. at 366.
161  127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007).
162  Id. at 1083.  
163  28 U.S.C. § 2422(d) creates a one-year statute of limitations for seeking federal habeas corpus relief from a 
state-court judgment, but provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 
toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”
164 127 S. Ct. at 1086.
165  See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007) (Thomas, J.) (concluding that the court of appeals lacked 
jurisdiction over a state prisoner’s federal habeas petition); id. at 2365 (“Within Constitutional bounds, Congress 
decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider.  Because Congress decides whether the federal 
courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them.”).
166  523 U.S. 637 (1998).
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was not yet ripe, did not render a subsequent habeas application raising that claim a “second or 
successive application” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244.167  Justices Scalia and Thomas 
each dissented.  Justice Scalia relied on the “unmistakable language” of the statute to conclude 
that Congress had deprived the courts of the jurisdiction that they had exercised before the 
enactment of AEDPA.168  Justice Thomas “beg[an] with the plain language of the statute,”169
relied on dictionary definitions of statutory terms,170 and scolded the Court for letting its view of 
what would be perverse “override the statute’s plain meaning.”171  In his dissent in Hohn v. 
United States,172 Justice Scalia (joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Thomas) advanced a similar 
argument. Their opinions in these cases rely quite explicitly on strong congressional-control 
models of federal jurisdiction.173
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr,174 the Court held that AEDPA and 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)175 did not 
deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to review an alien’s habeas petition.176  The majority 
relied heavily on canons of construction—including the doctrine of constitutional doubt—which
it deployed to require clear statements of congressional intent before effectively suspending the 
writ of habeas corpus.177  In dissent, Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas, and Justice O’Connor in part) criticized the Court for finding “ambiguity in the utterly 
clear language of a statute that forbids the district court (and all other courts) to entertain the 
                                                
167  Id. at 641–45.
168  Id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ( “It is impossible to conceive of language that more clearly precludes 
respondent’s renewed competency-to-be-executed claim than the written law before us here . . .  The Court today 
flouts the unmistakable language of the statute to avoid what it calls a ‘perverse’ result.  There is nothing ‘perverse’ 
about the result that the statute commands, except that it contradicts pre-existing judge-made law, which it was 
precisely the purpose of the statute to change.”); id. at 648 (“As hard as it may be for this Court to swallow, in [its] 
enactment of AEDPA Congress curbed our prodigality with the Great Writ.”).
169  Id. at 648 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170  Id. at 649.
171  Id. at 652–53; accord id. (“A statute that has the effect of precluding adjudication of a claim that for most of our 
Nation’s history would have been considered noncognizable on habeas can hardly be described as ‘perverse.’”). 
172  524 U.S. 236 (1998).  In Hohn, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to review a denial of an application for a 
certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).  Justice Scalia lamented that the Court’s view was 
“contrary to the plain import of the statute,” the “whole point” of which was “to keep petitioner’s case against 
respondent out of the Court of Appeals unless petitioner obtains a COA.”  Id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173  See, e.g., Stewart, 523 U.S. at 647 (“Congress did not even have to create inferior courts, let alone invest them 
with plenary habeas jurisdiction over state convictions.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
174  533 U.S. 289 (2001).
175  110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
176  533 U.S. at 314.
177  533 U.S. at 299-301.
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claims of aliens . . . found deportable by reason of their criminal acts.”178  He complained that 
“[i]t has happened before—too frequently, alas—that courts have distorted plain statutory text in 
order to produce a ‘more sensible’ result,” and he charged that the Court’s opinion did “violence 
. . . to the statutory text.”179  Finally, he belittled the Court’s reliance on the doctrine of 
constitutional doubt by arguing that it is “a device for interpreting what the statute says—not for 
ignoring what the statute says in order to avoid the trouble of determining whether what it says is 
unconstitutional.”180  To Justice Scalia, the statute was “crystal clear,”181 and that was largely the 
end of the matter.182
Yet another example of the textualists’ consistency in their approach to jurisdiction-
ousting statutes is Lindh v. Murphy.183  The Court held that certain provisions of AEDPA did not 
apply to non-capital cases pending at the time of the statute’s enactment.184  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist (joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) dissented.  He acknowledged that 
the Court had previously, in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer,185 “rejected a 
presumption favoring retroactivity for jurisdiction-creating statutes,” but argued that nothing in 
prior cases “disparaged our longstanding practice of applying jurisdiction-ousting statutes to 
pending cases.”186  In other words, the Court’s textualist Justices—all of whom had joined the 
opinion in Hughes—self-consciously applied different default rules to jurisdiction-creating and 
jurisdiction-ousting statutes, maximizing the chances that the Court would decline to exercise 
jurisdiction in any given case.    
To be sure, the textualist Justices did join the opinion in Felker v. Turpin,187 which 
avoided resolving any Suspension or Exceptions Clause issues by noting that Congress had not 
purported in AEDPA to strip the Supreme Court of its “original” jurisdiction to grant habeas 
                                                
178  Id. at 326-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179  Id. at 335.  
180  Id. at 336.
181  Id.
182  Others have argued that the statute in fact clearly supported the majority’s view, at least for the question at issue.  
See Amanda L.Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1450 (2005).
183  521 U.S. 320 (1997).
184  Id. at 323.
185  520 U.S. 939 (1997).
186  Id. at 342, n.2  (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
187  518 U.S. 651 (1996).
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petitions.188  But the Court has rarely exercised that jurisdiction.  More important for present 
purposes, Felker itself upheld a statute that substantially narrowed federal court jurisdiction in 
habeas cases, and in this respect the decision is consistent with the textualist Justices’ more 
general pattern of construing strictly only those jurisdictional statutes that limit, rather than 
expand, federal court jurisdiction.189  
Of course, it is possible that the textualists’ approach to AEDPA reflects judicial hostility 
to habeas claims by persons convicted of crimes, or perhaps sympathy for claims of judicial 
federalism, more than it demonstrates anything particular about federal-court jurisdiction in 
general.190  Any such argument is at best incomplete, however, because the textualists’ approach 
to AEDPA is consistent with their approach to other statutes that purport to limit the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts.  
There are a litany of examples.  In Woodford v. Ngo,191 for example, the Court’s 
textualists interpreted the exhaustion provision in the Prison Litigation Reform Act192 to preclude 
suits in which the prisoner filed an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective state 
administrative grievance or appeal.193  In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee,194 the Court held that the IIRIRA deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction over a 
suit raising a selective-enforcement claim against INS.  Justice Scalia’s majority, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and O’Connor, advanced a “narrow reading” 
of the relevant provision of the statute,195 and chastised Justice Souter’s contrary reading for 
departing from the plain import of the statute’s language.196      
                                                
188  Id. at 659-61; see Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of 
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000).
189  See Resnik, supra note 108, at 2623–27; Jackson, supra note 60, at 2451–52; Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 101, 
at 22–25. 
190  See infra notes 344–361 and accompanying text.
191  126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006).
192  42 U.S.C.§ 1997e.
193  Justice Alito wrote the opinion, and he was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
Kennedy, and Breyer.  The Court relied heavily on the meaning of the statute’s term “exhausted.”  Id. at 2387.
194  525 U.S. 471 (1999).
195  525 U.S. at 487.
196  See id. at 485, n.9 (“[A]ny challenge to imagination posed by reading s 1252(g) as written would be a small price 
to pay for escaping the overwhelming difficulties of Justice Souter’s theory. . . .  We do not think our interpretation 
‘parses s 1252(g) too finely,’ but if it did, we would think that modest fault preferable to the exercise of such a novel 
power of nullification.”).  The Court also concluded that the doctrine of constitutional doubt did not require a 
different result.  Id. at 487–92.
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The pattern does not simply for statutes limiting jurisdiction over claims by disfavored 
litigants.  The textualists also dissented, in Hibbs v. Winn,197 from the Court’s conclusion that the 
Tax Injunction Act198 does not bar an action raising an Establishment Clause challenge to a 
state’s tax program for allocating revenue to private schools.  In reaching that conclusion, the 
majority relied in part on legislative history and statutory purpose.199  Justice Kennedy (joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas) argued, in dissent, that the Court’s 
interpretation of the statute “contrasts with a literal reading of its terms,” and that “[i]n the end 
the scope and purpose of the Act should be understood from its terms alone.”200  Kennedy relied 
on dictionary definitions of statutory terms, and criticized the Court’s reliance on the statute’s 
legislative history and purposes, at least with respect to a statute that contains “a plain 
congressional declaration” on the matter in question.201  Justice Kennedy also expressly invoked 
the congressional-control model of federal jurisdiction in support of his view.202  Similarly, 
Justice Scalia dissented in Webster v. Doe.203 There, the Court held that a discharged CIA 
employee’s constitutional claims were judicially reviewable notwithstanding a provision of the 
National Security Act of 1947204 that, when viewed in light of the Administrative Procedure 
Act,205 arguably divested the federal courts of the power to review such termination decisions.  
Justice Scalia relied on what he viewed as the straightforward reading of the relevant statutory 
provisions,206 and made clear that he accepts the congressional-control model of federal 
jurisdiction, at least with respect to jurisdiction-stripping statutes.207
The textualists have advanced this view of statutes authorizing jurisdiction over limited 
classes of more mundane claims, as well.  In Finley v. United States,208 Justice Scalia wrote for a 
                                                
197  542 U.S. 88 (2004).
198  28 U.S.C. § 1341.
199  See id. at 104-07.
200  Id. at 113-114 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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bare majority, holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)209 did not permit exercise of 
pendent-party jurisdiction over claims against parties as to which no independent basis for 
federal subject matter jurisdiction existed.210  Justice Scalia began by noting the “rudimentary 
law” that in order for there to be federal jurisdiction, “an act of Congress must have supplied 
it.”211  He then acknowledged that the Court had not always carefully adhered to this rule in 
cases involving pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,212 but he stated that “with respect to the 
addition of parties, as opposed to the addition of only claims, we will not assume that the full 
constitutional power has been congressionally authorized, and will not read jurisdictional statutes 
broadly.”213  Reading the text of the FTCA narrowly, Justice Scalia noted that § 1346(b) was not
“formulat[ed as] one might expect if the presence of a claim against the United States constituted 
merely a minimum jurisdictional requirement, rather than a definition of the permissible scope of 
FTCA actions.”214  The Court accordingly concluded that “‘against the United States’ means 
against the United States and no one else,” and that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff’s claims against parties other than the United States.215    
Likewise, the Court’s textualists have taken the Court to task for failing to observe the 
limits that they have found in the plain terms of the removal statute.  In Murphy Bros., Inc. v. 
Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,216  the Court held that a defendant must be officially summoned to 
                                                
209  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
210  490 U.S. at 555-56.  Finley was statutorily overruled by 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
211  Id. at 548 (quoting The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252 (1868)).
212  490 U.S. at 548 (noting that in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), and its progeny, the Court 
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216  526 U.S. 344 (1999).
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appear in an action before the time to remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) begins to run.217  The 
Court relied in part on the legislative history of the statute and its revisions in reaching its 
conclusion and in rejecting the court of appeals’ reliance on the “plain meaning” of the statute.218  
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) urged reliance on the 
“plain language” of section 1446(b), chastising the Court for “superimpos[ing] a judicially 
created service of process requirement onto § 1446(b).”219  The dissenters argued that the Court’s 
approach departed “from this Court’s practice of strictly construing removal and similar 
jurisdictional statutes,”220 an approach that would have limited the ability of litigants to invoke 
federal jurisdiction via removal.  
Justice Scalia offered a similar view, this time for the Court, in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant 
Energy Serv., Inc.221 There, he concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)’s prohibition on appellate 
review of subject-matter-jurisdiction-based remands222 does not require an absence of 
jurisdiction at the time of removal.  He reached this conclusion based on the “standard principle 
of statutory construction [that] provides that identical words and phrases within the same statute 
should normally be given the same meaning,”223 and he rejected the petitioner’s contention 
because it had “no textual support.”224  Justice Scalia made clear that textualist principles of 
statutory interpretation drove the decision: “We will not ignore a clear jurisdictional statute in 
reliance upon supposition of what Congress really wanted,” because “[a]s far as the Third 
Branch is concerned, what the text of § 1447(d) indisputably does prevails over what it ought to 
have done.”225  
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218 526 U.S. at 351–53.
219  Id. at 357 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
220  See id. at 357 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941)).
221  127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007).
222  28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) provides in relevant part: “An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was 
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223  Id. at 2417.
224  Id. at 2419.
225  Id. at 2420.  Justices Scalia and Thomas advanced a similarly narrow interpretation of the removal statute’s 
appellate review provisions in Osborn v. Haley, 127 S. Ct. 881 (2007), in which, the Court held that a district court’s 
order remanding to state court a suit against a federal employee was reviewable notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 
1447(d), which limits the reviewability of remand orders.  Id. at 895-96.  Section 1447(d) provides: “An order 
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . .”  28 
U.S.C. § 1447(d).  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that section 1447(d)’s plain terms 
should have controlled.  He complained that “[f]ew statutes read more clearly” than section 1447(d), and that the 
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Finally, the textualists have generally refused to find federal jurisdiction without an 
explicit grant of statutory authority:  In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,226 the 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that the district court lacked inherent power to 
enforce the terms of a settlement agreement under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, where 
the agreement was not part of the order of dismissal and there was no independent basis for 
federal subject-matter jurisdiction.227  Justice Scalia explained that “[f]ederal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction,” and that “[t]hey possess only that power authorized by Constitution and 
statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.”  Accordingly, it “is to be presumed that 
a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests 
upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”228  The textualists have also advanced this position by 
granting a motion to dismiss a dispensable non-diverse party,229 and by regularly joining
opinions expressing reluctance to find appellate jurisdiction under the judicially created 
collateral-order doctrine.230  
Textualists, in other words, have consistently relied on the plain meaning of jurisdiction-
ousting or jurisdiction–limiting statutes to find that the federal courts have been deprived of 
jurisdiction.  In offering such interpretations of jurisdictional statutes, the Court’s textualists have 
often relied explicitly on a strong congressional-control model of federal jurisdiction, insisting 
that the federal courts cannot exercise jurisdiction that Congress has withheld.        
C.  Textualists’ Non-Textualist Approaches to Statutes Ostensibly Conferring Broad Jurisdiction
                                                                                                                                                            
Court’s reading “eviscerates what little remained of Congress’s court-limiting command.” Id. at __ (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).
226  511 U.S. 375 (1994).
227  Id. at 381–82.
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the basis for federal-court jurisdiction over the contract dispute.”  Id. at 382.
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Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989); Van Cauwenberghe v. Baird, 486 U.S. 517 (1988).
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But the textualists on the Court have not always advanced the congressional-control 
model of federal jurisdiction.  In cases interpreting statutes that, by their plain terms, seem to 
confer expansive jurisdiction, the textualists have often read the statutes atextually to find that 
the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction.  
Recall Justice Scalia’s willingness in Hamdan to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over 
the petitioner’s habeas claims, even if Congress had not withheld such jurisdiction in enacting 
the DTA.  In that case, he urged abstention out of a concern for “interbranch comity.”231  
Interbranch comity has led the Court, and at least some of its textualists, to consider or urge 
abstention in other contexts, as well.  In Republic of Austria v. Altmann,232 the Court held that the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies to conduct that occurred prior to its enactment, thus 
authorizing jurisdiction over a suit that would have been barred if filed at the time that the 
challenged conduct occurred.233  
The Courts’ textualists divided in their views of the jurisdictional question.  Justice 
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that the 
statute should be read against the presumption against retroactivity.234  In concluding that the 
federal courts lacked jurisdiction, they thus did not rely solely on the statute’s plain language, 
instead insisting on a clear statement from Congress of retroactive effect.235  In contrast, Justice 
Scalia both joined the Court’s opinion and filed a separate concurring opinion.  As is discussed 
below, his separate opinion could be characterized as advancing the strong congressional-control 
model of federal court jurisdiction, in a case in which Congress apparently expanded rather than 
limited lower-federal-court jurisdiction.236  But Justice Scalia also joined Justice Stevens’s 
opinion for the court, which announced the Court’s willingness to “decline to exercise 
jurisdiction in particular cases implicating foreign sovereign immunity” in response to Executive 
Branch statements of interest.  Such statements “might well be entitled to deference as the 
                                                
231  126 S. Ct. at 2822 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232  541 U.S. 677 (2004).
233  Id. at 700.
234  Id. at 715-20, 737 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
235  See id. at 720-21.
236  See infra at notes 294–299 and accompanying text; 541 U.S. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A] jurisdiction-
expanding statute should e applied to subsequent cases even if it sometimes has the effect of creating a forum where 
none existed.”).
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considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of foreign policy,” and thus might 
warrant abstention.237
Although Hamdan and Altmann involved claims for abstention in the name of interbranch 
comity, the Court’s textualists have also urged or required the lower federal courts to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction that Congress ostensibly has conferred in cases that do not involve weighty 
questions of the separation of powers.  Several decisions demonstrate the Court’s textualists’
refusing to assert apparently available jurisdiction based on atextual considerations.  In Penzoil 
Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,238 for example, the Court held that the district court should have abstained, 
under the doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris,239 from hearing the plaintiff’s federal claims, 
which the judgment debtor had not presented to the Texas courts, because it was possible that the 
claims would be mooted by resolution of the state-court proceeding.240  Justice Scalia joined the 
opinion, even though, as he stated in his separate concurrence, he saw “no jurisdictional bar to 
the Court’s decision in this case.”241   The Court’s textualists also joined the Court’s opinion in 
Tenet v. Doe,242 which required the dismissal of a suit by an alleged former spy seeking to 
enforce an espionage agreement, under the doctrine of Totten v. United States,243 which 
“precludes judicial review in cases such as respondents’ where success depends upon the 
existence of their secret espionage relationship with the Government.”244  The Court made clear 
that the Totten doctrine was effectively jurisdictional,245 and Justice Scalia concurred to make 
clear his view that, contrary to Justice Stevens’s assertion in his own concurring opinion,246 “as 
                                                
237  541 U.S. at 701–02.
238  481 U.S. 1 (1987).
239  401 U.S. 37 (1971).
240  481 U.S. at 17.
241  Id. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring).
242  544 U.S. 1 (2005).
243  92 U.S. 105 (1876).
244  544 U.S. at 8.  Of course, it is not implausible to premise a rule such as Totten’s on the separation of powers, as 
Justice Scalia had urged in Hamdan.  But the Court in Tenet relied more on the exigencies of intelligence gathering 
than any concern about judicial interference with Executive functions.  See id. at 10–11.
245  See id. at 6, n.4 (“application of the Totten rule of dismissal, like the abstention doctrine of Younger or the 
prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before 
addressing jurisdiction.”); id. ( “It would be inconsistent with the unique and categorical nature of the Totten bar—a 
rule designed not merely to defeat the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry—to first allow discovery or 
other proceedings in order to resolve the jurisdictional question.”).
246  Justice Stevens argued in his concurrence that the Court’s decision means that a court can resolve the merits of a 
case even if there is a jurisdictional bar.  Id. at 11–12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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applied today, the bar of Totten is a jurisdictional one.”247  Justice Scalia thus expressly 
acknowledged and agreed to apply an implicit, judge-made jurisdictional bar to prevent the 
assertion of jurisdiction, which was presumably otherwise available under the general federal-
question statute.248
Indeed, although the language of the federal-question statute is almost identical to that in 
Article III,249 the Court has long treated the statute as conferring less than the full extent of 
jurisdiction authorized by the Constitution.250  The textualists have, for the most part, not 
questioned this fundamentally atextual approach to the federal-question statute.251  In Rivet v. 
Regents Bank of Louisiana,252 for example, the textualist Justices joined the Court’s opinion 
applying the well-pleaded complaint rule in a federal question suit, even though the Court made 
clear long ago that the well-pleaded complaint rule is not required by the language of Article 
III.253  And in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,254 Justice Scalia, writing 
                                                
247  Id. at 12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
248  See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  The Supreme Court did not address the government’s contention that the Tucker Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), required the respondents to file their claims in the Court of Federal Claims, rather than the 
district court.  See 544 U.S. at 6 n.4.
249  Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”) with U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall 
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . .”).
250  Compare Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), with Louisville and N.R. Co. v. 
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); see Friedman, A Different Dialogue, supra note 5, at 24 (“[T]he Court consistently 
has interpreted the statutory grant as narrower than the jurisdiction suggested by the constitutional text. . . .  Indeed, 
the Court has abandoned all pretense that it is following Congress’s intent in enacting the federal question 
jurisdictional grant . . .””).
251  Indeed, there have been occasional objections to broader interpretations of the jurisdiction conferred by section 
1331.  In Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering and Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005), the 
Court held that there was jurisdiction under section 1331 over a state-law quiet title action that depended on the 
interpretation of a provision of federal tax law.  The Court suggested a multi-factored, contextual inquiry for 
deciding whether a state-law claim arises under federal law.  Justice Thomas concurred on the ground that the Court 
had “faithfully applie[d] our precedents interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to authorize federal-court jurisdiction over 
some cases in which state law creates the cause of action but requires determination of an issue of federal law,” id. at 
320 (Thomas, J., concurring), but he indicated willingness in an appropriate case and “with the benefit of better 
evidence as to the original meaning of § 1331’s text” to consider adopting Justice Holmes’s creation test, see id. at 
320 (citing American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916)); see also Smith v. Kansas City 
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas noted that “[j]urisdictional rules 
should be clear,” and lamented that current law “is anything but clear.”  Id. at 321.  Justice Thomas, in other words, 
is willing to consider an interpretation of section 1331 that narrows, albeit perhaps not dramatically, see id. at 321, 
the types of case that are within the federal question grant.  (He was willing to assume for “present purposes” that it 
is proper for the Court to read section 1331 “more narrowly” than the arising under clause in Article III.  See id. at 
320, n.*.)
252  522 U.S. 470 (1998).
253  See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
254  535 U.S. 826 (2002).
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for the Court, read 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which confers original jurisdiction on “civil actions arising 
under any Act of Congress relating to patents,” implicitly to incorporate the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, as well.255  
The textualists have not limited their atextual approach the general federal-question 
statute.  Justice Scalia also offered a narrow interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which 
ostensibly is a broad jurisdictional grant, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.256  In Sosa, the Court held 
that the Alien Tort Statute, which confers jurisdiction on the federal courts over suits by aliens 
for torts committed in violation of the law of nations, authorizes courts to hear claims “in a very 
limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law.”257  The majority 
read the statute to authorize a narrow class of claims based on current international norms, as 
long as they do not have “less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the 
historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”258  
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued in his 
separate opinion that the ATS does not confer discretion on the federal courts to create causes of 
action for the enforcement of international-law-based norms.259  Justice Scalia did not deny that 
the ATS confers jurisdiction, but he argued that it should not be read to authorize federal 
common-law making by courts in the post-Erie era:  “In holding open the possibility that judges 
may create rights where Congress has not authorized them to do so, the Court countenances 
judicial occupation of a domain that belongs to the people’s representatives,” hardly a “recipe for 
restraint in the future.”260  Although Justice Scalia’s argument thus focused on the nature of the 
                                                
255  The decision in Holmes Group, to be sure, was largely driven by precedent, but Justice Scalia also argued that 
the conclusion was based on “what the words of the statute must fairly be understood to mean.”  Id. at 833.  He 
argued that the phrase arising under is “familiar to all law students as invoking the well-pleaded complaint rule.”  Id. 
at 833.  This reading deprived the Federal Circuit of appellate jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action that 
included a counterclaim arising under the patent laws, although it would not have deprived a different federal court 
of appeals of jurisdiction. See id. at 840 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The sole question presented 
here concerns Congress’ allocation of adjudicatory authority among the federal courts of appeals.”).
256  542 U.S. 692 (2004).
257  Id. at 713; see id. at 725.  
258  Id. at 732.   As in Altmann, the Court also suggested the possibility of abstention in a case involving a claim 
under the ATS.  See id. at 733 n.21 (“Another possibility that we need not apply here is a policy of case-specific 
deference to the political branches. . . .  In such cases, there is a strong argument that federal courts should give 
serious weight to the Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign policy.”).  His opinion thus might 
have been driven by concerns of interbranch comity, but its approach to federal court jurisdiction is consistent with 
his approach in cases that do not involve such concerns.  
259  Id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
260  Id. at 747–48.
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claims, if any, that can be asserted in a suit filed under the ATS’s jurisdictional grant, rather than 
on the scope of the jurisdictional grant itself, his view would essentially have rendered 
meaningless the jurisdictional grant in the statute.
The Court’s textualists have similarly not shied away from narrowly reading the grant of 
jurisdiction in the diversity statute.261  In Carden v. Arkoma Associates,262 the Court held, in an 
opinion by Justice Scalia, that the citizenship of limited partners had to be taken into account to 
determine diversity of citizenship in a case in which one of the parties was a limited 
partnership.263  Justice Scalia relied principally on precedent264 and Congress’s likely 
understanding of the statutory terms in light of precedent.265  But he also insisted that the 
question whether any given “artificial entity” should be considered a “citizen” for diversity 
purposes, and “which of their members’ citizenship is to be consulted, are questions more readily 
resolved by legislative prescription than by legal reasoning.”266  The Court thus concluded that it 
would “leave” such decisions “to Congress.”267
But to insist that the task of defining the citizenship of a particular party should fall to 
Congress simply begs the question whether Congress effectively had done so already, in enacting 
section 1332.  There is no doubt that congressional elaboration of the term “citizen” would be 
helpful, but it is hardly unusual for the Court to give meaning to generalized statutory terms.  
The Court in Carden most assuredly did construe the term “citizen,” to embrace all of the 
individuals who constitute a partnership.  But this interpretation, when viewed with Justice 
Scalia’s suggestion, in other contexts, about the legislative role, effectively means that in cases 
of statutory ambiguity, the Court should construe jurisdictional statutes in a way that defeats, 
                                                
261  28 U.S.C. § 1332.
262  494 U.S. 185 (1990).
263  The relevant statutory provision is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), which provides: “The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”
264  494 U.S. at 196 (“The resolutions we have reached above can validly be characterized as technical, precedent-
bound, and unresponsive to policy considerations raised by the changing realities of business organization. But, as 
must be evident from our earlier discussion, that has been the character of our jurisprudence in this field . . .”  (citing 
Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 153 (1965)).  
265  494 U.S. at 196 (noting that Congress had amended section 1332 to modify the judicial understanding of the 
citizenship of corporations, and that “[n]o provision was made for the treatment of artificial entities other than 
corporations . . . .”).
266  Id. at 196-97.
267  Id. at 197.
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rather than confers, jurisdiction.268  Such a canon might be defensible, but, as explained in Part 
IV, it is in serious tension with textualist claims about faithful agency and legislative 
supremacy.269
Indeed, the Court’s textualists have not hesitated to join opinions that have recognized
judicially created, atextual exceptions to the grant of jurisdiction in the diversity statute.  In 
Ankenbrandt v. Richards,270 the Court held that there is an implicit domestic-relations exception 
to the jurisdiction conferred by the diversity statute,271 which encompasses only cases involving 
the issuance of divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.272  The Court reached this 
conclusion even after acknowledging that Article III “does not mandate the exclusion of 
domestic relations cases from federal-court jurisdiction.”273  Moreover, the Court also 
acknowledged that Congress had amended the diversity statute in 1948, well after the Court had 
first suggested the existence of an implicit domestic relations exception to the diversity 
jurisdiction,274 to bring within the diversity jurisdiction a seemingly broader class of cases.275  
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, among others, joined Justice White’s opinion for the Court.  
To be sure, the Court in Ankenbrandt offered a relatively narrow scope for the domestic-
relations exception.  But other members of the Court urged an even more restrained approach.  In 
his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Blackmun was “unable to agree . . . that the 
                                                
268  In any event, Justice Scalia and the Court’s textualists has been willing to join opinions interpreting the terms 
“citizens or subjects of a foreign state” to apply to somewhat murky circumstances.  See JPMorgan Chase Bank v. 
Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure, Ltd., 536 U.S. 88 (2002) (holding that a corporation organized under the laws 
of the British Virgin Islands, an overseas territory of the United Kingdom, is a “citize[n] or subject[t] of a foreign 
state” within the meaning of § 1332).
269  The Court’s textualists have pursued such an approach in addressing other questions that the diversity statute 
does not specifically or plainly address, as well.  In Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, 541 U.S. 567 (2004), the 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Thomas, held that a post-filing change in the plaintiff limited partnership’s citizenship, resulting from the 
withdrawal from the partnership of the two partners who at the time of filing were not diverse from the defendant, 
could not cure the time-of-filing defect in diversity jurisdiction.  This certainly was not the only possible resolution 
of the case, particularly in light of precedent.  See id. at 588–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the rationale 
of Caterpillar v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996), permits a post-filing change to cure a jurisdictional defect, raised for the 
first time after a jury verdict).
270  504 U.S. 689 (1992).
271  Id. at 700-01.
272  Id. at 704.
273  Id. at 697.
274  The genesis of the domestic-relations exception was the Court’s decision in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 
(1859), which did not mention the diversity statute.
275  504 U.S. at 698–700 (noting that in 1948 Congress amended the statute to change the phrase “all suits of a civil 
nature at common law or in equity” to “all civil actions”).
45
diversity statute contains any ‘exception’ for domestic relations matters.”276  In reaching that 
conclusion, he relied on the language of the then-current diversity statute, arguing that a “change 
in language that, if anything, expands the jurisdictional scope of a statute” is meager evidence 
“of approval of a prior narrow construction,” particularly a prior construction that was, at best, 
only implicit in the Court’s prior decisions.277
It is perhaps telling that Justice Scalia joined the Court’s opinion in Ankenbrandt.  Justice 
White, writing for the Court, argued that “[w]hen Congress amended the diversity statute in 1948 
to replace the law/equity distinction”—which had been part of the basis for the Court’s original 
suggestion of a domestic-relations exception278—“with the phrase ‘all civil actions,’ we presume 
Congress did so with full cognizance of the Court's nearly century-long interpretation of the prior 
statutes, which had construed the statutory diversity jurisdiction to contain an exception for 
certain domestic relations matters.”279  Yet six years after joining Justice White’s opinion, Justice 
Scalia, in dissent in Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,280 which interpreted AEDPA’s modifications 
to the habeas regime, criticized the Court for “flout[ing] the unmistakable language of the statute 
to avoid what it calls a ‘perverse’ result,” when the only thing perverse “about the result that the 
statute commands . . . [is] that it contradicts pre-existing judge-made law, which it was precisely 
the purpose of the statute to change.”281  There is nothing inherently wrong, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, with such an argument, but it would seem to apply with equal force to 
the diversity statute.  The “pre-existing judge-made law” in the context of the diversity statute, 
however, unlike the pre-AEDPA body of law, deprived rather than expanded federal-court 
jurisdiction.  In each case, Justice Scalia chose the construction that limited federal-court 
jurisdiction.    
                                                
276  Id. at 707 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
277  Id. at 708.  Indeed, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Thomas, would have left for another day whether there is a 
domestic-relations exception to the diversity jurisdiction, finding it clear that, even if there is such an exception, it 
did not apply to that case.  Id. at 717–18 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
278  The appellant in Barber had argued that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over matters related to divorce and 
alimony because such matters were exclusively ecclesiastical at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and 
thus that the phrase “law and equity” did not embrace cases addressing such subjects.  See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 
693–94.
279  Id. at 700.
280  523 U.S. 637 (1998).
281  Id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46
A unanimous Court similarly concluded, in Marshall v. Marshall,282 that the probate 
exception to federal jurisdiction does not apply to deprive a bankruptcy court of jurisdiction over 
a claim that a third party tortiously interfered with a widow’s expectancy of inheritance from her 
deceased husband.  The Court noted that the exception is a “judicially created doctrine[] 
stemming in large measure from misty understandings of English legal history,”283 and made 
clear its desire to curtail “sweeping extension[s]” of the exception.284   But as in Ankenbrandt, 
the Court, whose opinion all of the Court’s textualists joined,285 did not abandon the 
exception,286 even though Justice Stevens urged the Court to do.287  
It is possible, of course, that the limitations that have been imposed by the Court or 
proposed by individual Justices on the diversity jurisdiction reflect a frequently noted judicial 
hostility to that particular grant of jurisdiction.288  But the Court’s consistently stingy 
interpretation of the diversity statute is in fact consistent with the larger pattern identifiable in its 
treatment of other statutory grants of jurisdiction.   And the judicial willingness to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction that Congress seems to have granted—whether expressed as a form of 
abstention doctrine, as in Penzoil, as a limitation implicit in the statute’s terms, as in Carden, or 
as a judicially created exception to the statute’s grant of jurisdiction, as in Ankenbrandt and 
Marshall—is in considerable tension with the congressional-control model of federal 
jurisdiction.  Indeed, Martin Redish, an avid proponent of the strong congressional-control model 
both for jurisdiction-ousting and jurisdiction-conferring statutes, has compared the diversity 
exceptions to other partial abstention doctrines289 and argued that both are equally 
                                                
282  126 S. Ct. 1735 (2006).
283  Id. at 1741.
284  Id. 
285  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito all joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for 
the Court.
286  Id. at 1748 (“[T]he probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or annulment of a will and the 
administration of a decedent's estate; it also precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose of property that is 
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287  See id. at 1750-52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I write separately to explain 
why I do not believe there is any “probate exception” that ousts a federal court of jurisdiction it otherwise 
possesses.”).  
288  See Friedman, A Different Dialogue, supra note 5, at 25-28 (“These decisions make sense only when one 
recognizes that the Court has little use for the diversity jurisdiction and has urged its curtailment whenever 
possible.”); Richard D. Freer, The Cauldron Boils: Supplemental Jurisdiction, Amount in Controversy, and Diversity 
of Citizenship Class Actions, 53 EMORY L.J. 55, 60 (2004) (hereinafter, Freer, The Cauldron Boils).
289  See Redish, Abstention, supra note 6, at 102–05.
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constitutionally problematic as a matter of the separation of powers.290  More important for 
present purposes, the textualists’ willingness to abstain or to read statutory grants of jurisdiction 
to include implicit exceptions suggests a very different view of Congress’s authority to control 
the federal jurisdictional regime than do the cases described in the prior section, in which the 
textualists regularly insisted that it impermissibly ignores Congress’s authority to exercise 
jurisdiction that Congress did not explicitly confer upon the federal courts.
D.  Counter-Trends: Textualist Approaches to Statutes Ostensibly Conferring Broad Jurisdiction
All of this is not to suggest that the Court’s textualists always depart from textualist 
approaches to the broad statutory grants of jurisdiction.  In most cases in which jurisdiction is 
premised on those statutes, after all, there is no colorable contention that the Court does not have, 
or ought not to exercise, jurisdiction.  But the Court tends to address only difficult cases, or at 
least those cases in which there is more than one colorable argument.291  In those cases, as 
illustrated above, the Court’s textualists have departed from plain statutory text to find that the 
federal courts lack jurisdiction with surprising frequency.   
Yet even among the difficult cases in which there are colorable arguments both for and 
against federal jurisdiction, there are some notable exceptions to the pattern described above. As 
a preliminary matter, it is possible to view the position of the Court’s textualists in Ankenbrandt
and Marshall, and Justice Scalia’s position in Altmann, as evidence of a willingness to read even 
expansive statutory grants of jurisdiction according to their plain terms.  In Ankenbrandt and 
Marshall, after all, the textualists joined opinions that arguably narrowed judicially crafted, 
atextual exceptions—the domestic-relations and probate exceptions, respectively—to federal-
court jurisdiction.292  But as noted above, some members of the Court in those cases urged 
                                                
290  See id. at 75-79 (arguing that abstention doctrine are inconsistent with American political theory because it 
involves courts refusing to exercise jurisdiction that Congress has granted); Gunther, Subtle Vices, supra note 50, at 
9-15 (criticizing as unprincipled Bickelian discretionary devices to avoid deciding cases); Friedman, A Different 
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292  See RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
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wholesale rejection of the exceptions, which the Court, and its textualists, declined to do.293  In 
Altmann, Justice Scalia argued in his separate opinion that the Court had not properly taken 
account of the “consistent practice of giving immediate effect to statutes that alter a court’s 
jurisdiction,”294 a practice that, in that case, required the conclusion that the Court had 
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims.  In this respect, Justice Scalia appeared to endorse the 
strong congressional-control model of federal jurisdiction both for statutes conferring and 
ousting jurisdiction.295  But the bulk of Justice Scalia’s argument appeared directed toward
demonstrating that jurisdiction-ousting statutes should be applied to pending cases,296 a matter 
over which Justice Scalia had previously sparred with his non-textualist colleagues.297  
Ultimately, though, Justice Scalia joined the Court’s opinion, which also held open the 
possibility that the Court would abstain in cases implicating foreign sovereign immunity.298  
Meanwhile, the Court’s other textualists were in dissent, arguing that the Court should not have 
found jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims.299  Ankenbrandt, Marshall, and Altmann thus are 
not powerful counter-examples of the pattern described above.
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(supporting view by arguing that “applying a jurisdiction-eliminating statute to undo past judicial action would be 
applying it retroactively; but applying it to prevent any judicial action after the statute takes effect is applying it 
prospectively.”).
297  See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
298  See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 701-02; supra notes 232– 237 and accompanying text.
299  See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 715-20 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas).
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Other cases, however, suggest more willingness on the part of the Court’s textualists to 
read statutes ostensibly conferring expansive jurisdiction according to their plain language.  In 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., Inc.,300 a divided Court held that a federal court sitting in 
diversity may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over additional 
plaintiffs whose claims do not satisfy the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement, 
provided that the claims are part of the same case or controversy as the claims of plaintiffs who 
do allege a sufficient amount in controversy.301  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in an 
opinion that Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, stated that “[w]e must not give jurisdictional 
statutes a more expansive interpretation than their text warrants.” But he also insisted that “it is 
just as important not to adopt an artificial construction that is narrower than what the text 
provides,” because “[n]o sound canon of interpretation requires Congress to speak with 
extraordinary clarity in order to modify the rules of federal jurisdiction within appropriate 
constitutional bounds.”302  The Court thus relied on section 1367’s “text in light of context, 
structure, and related statutory provisions,”303 and found the statute to be a “broad jurisdictional 
grant, with no distinction between pendent-claim and pendent-party cases.”304  The Court also 
declined to treat arguably contrary indications in the statute’s legislative history as authoritative 
evidence of congressional intent, offering the familiar textualist critique of reliance on legislative 
history.305    
                                                
300  545 U.S. 546 (2005).
301  Id. at 549.
302  Id. at 558.
303  Id.
304  Id. at 559.  
305  Justice Kennedy explained:
As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or 
any other extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent 
they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms. Not 
all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into legislative understandings, however, and 
legislative history in particular is vulnerable to two serious criticisms. First, legislative history is itself 
often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory. . . .  Second, judicial reliance on legislative materials like 
committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the requirements of Article I, may give 
unrepresentative committee members-or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists-both the power and 
the incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to 
achieve through the statutory text. We need not comment here on whether these problems are sufficiently 
prevalent to render legislative history inherently unreliable in all circumstances, a point on which 
Members of this Court have disagreed. It is clear, however, that in this instance both criticisms are right 
on the mark.
Id. at 567–69.
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Allapattah is a puzzling decision.  Although the majority argued that the statute was 
“unambiguous,”306 and read literally section 1367(b)’s exceptions to the jurisdiction conferred in 
section 1367(a),307 it is difficult to characterize the Court’s interpretation of section 1367(a) as 
obviously textualist.  To reach its conclusion, the majority was forced to read section 1367(a)’s 
phrase “civil action” to mean “claim.”308  To be sure, this reading was eminently defensible, but 
the reasons why it is defensible are largely independent of the plain text of the provision.309   
Even if the Court’s approach in Allapattah was not purely textualist, the fact remains that the 
Court’s textualists voted in favor of a more expansive interpretation of a federal jurisdictional 
statute than some of their non-textualist colleagues were prepared to accept.310  One possible 
explanation is that there were instrumental justifications for the competing views of the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute:  The Court’s substantive conservatives supplied an expanded 
                                                
306  Id. at 567.
307  Id. at 565-67.  Section 1367(a) provides: 
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in 
any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have 
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such 
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United 
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or 
intervention of additional parties.
Section 1367(b) provides: 
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332
of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims 
by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or 
seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction 
over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
28 U.S.C. § 1367.
308  See id. at 560-64; see generally Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 154-160.
309  See, e.g., John B. Oakley, Integrating Supplemental Jurisdiction and Diversity Jurisdiction: A Progress Report 
on the Work of the American Law Institute, 74 IND. L.J. 25, 45 (1998) (arguing for “claim-specific” interpretation of 
jurisdictional provisions, including section 1367, that are phrased in “action-specific” language); Freer, The 
Cauldron Boils, supra note 288, at 79-83.  Section 1367 is far from a model of clear drafting, and any interpretation 
based on its plain text would create a puzzling and unsatisfying regime of supplemental jurisdiction.  See, e.g., 
Richard D. Freer, Toward a Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction in Diversity of Citizenship 
Cases, 74 IND. L.J. 5, 12–22 (1998) (providing overview of problems with section 1367(b)).
310  Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Breyer, argued in dissent that the statutory predicate 
of a “civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction” was not satisfied in an action premised solely 
on diversity of citizenship when some of the plaintiffs failed to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.  Id. at 
584–95  (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 127–53. 
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avenue for defendants in class actions to remove to federal court,311 where the prospect of 
windfall judgments has diminished in recent years,312 and the Court’s liberals resisted this effort.  
Allapattah is not the only case in which the Court’s textualists read section 1367 to 
confer expansive federal jurisdiction.  In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons,313
the Court (including all of its textualists) held that 28 U.S.C. § 1441 permitted removal of 
constitutional claims challenging state designation of landmark status.314 In addition, the Court 
held that section 1367 authorized federal court jurisdiction over related state-law claims, even 
though the state-law claims called for deferential on-the-record review of state administrative 
findings.315  Justice O’Connor relied on the text of section 1367, finding no exception for “claims 
that require on-the-record review of a state or local administrative determination” and noting that 
“the statute generally confers supplemental jurisdiction over ‘all other claims’ in the same case 
or controversy as a federal question, without reference to the nature of review.”316  But even this 
reliance on the statute’s plain text was qualified; the Court noted that “there may be situations in 
which a district court should abstain from reviewing local administrative determinations even if 
the jurisdictional prerequisites are otherwise satisfied.”317  Accordingly, although the Court’s 
textualists followed the plain meaning of a broad grant of jurisdiction, they reserved the 
prerogative to limit jurisdiction through abstention. 
But the Court’s textualists have not always upheld plausible claims for abstention in
cases premised on the ostensibly expansive grant of jurisdiction in the general federal-question 
statute.  In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans,318 (NOPSI) for 
example, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court declining to extend the 
Younger319 and Burford320 abstention doctrines to a case challenging completed legislative 
                                                
311  Cf. Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
312  See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist, Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 
IND. L.J. 223, 296–305 (2003); Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions in the Gulf South Symposium, 74 TUL. L. REV. 
1603, 1607 (2000).
313  522 U.S. 156 (1997).
314  Id. at 164–66.
315  Id. at 171–72.
316  Id. at 169; see id. (“Congress could of course establish an exception to supplemental jurisdiction for claims 
requiring deferential review of state administrative decisions, but the statute, as written, bears no such 
construction.”).
317  Id. at 174.
318  491 U.S. 350 (1989).
319  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
320  Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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action.321  He emphasized that “cases have long supported the proposition that federal courts lack 
the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred.”322  Justice 
Scalia went so far as to declare that underlying that proposition “is the undisputed constitutional 
principle that Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the 
constitutionally permissible bounds.”323  Similarly, in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,324 the 
Court (in an opinion by Justice O’Connor) limited abstention doctrine by concluding that 
“federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only 
where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary,” and thus held that the 
district court’s remand order in a damages action was “an unwarranted application of the Burford
doctrine.”325  Justice Kennedy concurred, stating that “[w]e need not rule out . . . the possibility 
that a federal court might dismiss a suit for damages in a case where a serious affront to the 
interests of federalism could be averted in no other way.”326  This prompted Justice Scalia to 
concur separately to make clear his belief that such discretionary dismissals are not available.  As 
he did in NOPSI, Justice Scalia urged application of the strong congressional-control model, 
arguing that “[t]here is no ‘serious affront to the interests of federalism’ when Congress lawfully 
decides to pre-empt state action—which is what our cases hold (and today’s opinion affirms) 
Congress does whenever it instructs federal courts to assert jurisdiction over matters as to which 
relief is not discretionary.”327   Justice Scalia did not, however, question the propriety of 
abstention doctrine more generally, at least in cases in which the interest in judicial federalism 
was more pronounced.  
The cases discussed in this section make clear that the Court’s textualists have not always 
upheld claims for abstention from exercising otherwise broad statutory grants of jurisdiction.
Indeed the textualists are clearly of two minds in such cases, perhaps torn (as I discuss in detail 
                                                
321  491 U.S. at 372-73.
322  Id. at 358
323  Id. at 358–59.  His opinion for the Court characterized the Younger and Burford abstention cases as not being 
about jurisdiction per se, but rather about “the federal courts’ discretion in determining whether to grant certain 
types of relief—a discretion that was part of the common-law background against which the statutes conferring 
jurisdiction were enacted.”  Id. at 359.
324  517 U.S. 706 (1996).
325  Id. at 731.  
326  Id. at 733 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
327  Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring (quoting id. at 733 (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see Meltzer, Jurisdiction and 
Discretion Revisited, supra note 56, at 1893–94 (arguing that Quackenbush and NOPSI are inconsistent with 
Shapiro’s argument about discretion).  
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in the section that follows) between the competing mandates of faithful agent theory and judicial 
minimalism.  Fittingly, the cases discussed here all involved the abstention side of the 
congressional-control question—that is, jurisdictional grants that, by their plain terms, appear to 
confer expansive jurisdiction.  It is telling that there have been almost no cases in which the 
Court’s textualists have read a statute ostensibly ousting the federal courts of jurisdiction to do 
less than its plain terms suggest.  
IV.  TEXTUALISM AND JURISDICTION
The discussion in Part III demonstrated that although the Court’s textualist-leaning 
Justices have consistently applied a textualist approach to jurisdiction-ousting statutes, they have 
not been as consistent in interpreting statutes that appear to grant jurisdiction without exception.  
In this Part, I consider explanations for the selective approach of the Court’s textualists to 
jurisdictional statutes.  I then turn to what the approach of the Court’s textualists to jurisdictional 
statutes reveals both about textualism and, more broadly, about the debate over the appropriate 
roles of Congress and the federal courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime.  
A.  Explanations for the Selective Application of Textualism to Jurisdictional Statutes  
1.  Fidelity v. Judicial Constraint
Textualists contend that courts should be faithful agents of the legislature, and, 
accordingly, that courts should implement only those instructions that appear in the plain text of 
legislative enactments.  As John Manning has argued, this conviction leads them to “subscribe to 
the general principle that texts should be taken at face value—with no implied extensions of 
specific texts or exceptions to general ones—even if the legislation will then have an awkward 
relationship to the apparent background intention or purpose that produced it.”328  Faithful 
agency, in other words, requires strict adherence to the statutory text.  
Textualism also proceeds from the assumption that the exercise of judicial power, unless 
properly cabined, tends towards impermissible judicial lawmaking, in tension with constitutional 
                                                
328  Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 65, at 424–25; see also supra, notes 65–70, 81–82 and accompanying 
text.
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structure and basic democratic theory.329  As noted in Part II, textualists have argued that limiting 
judges to the consideration of text in statutory construction more effectively constrains judicial 
discretion than other approaches to statutory interpretation, and thus more effectively serves 
democratic objectives.  Textualists often argue that it is not only important to constrain judges 
from doing mischief in cases that are properly before them, but also that, as a general matter, it is 
desirable in a democracy to limit the range of cases in which judges have authority to act at all.  
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, for example, Justice Scalia lamented that the Court “seems 
incapable of admitting that some matters—any matters—are none of its business.”330  The most 
prominent textualists regularly have expressed concern about preserving “the proper—and 
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.”331
When Congress enacts a statute purporting to oust the courts of jurisdiction, the textualist 
judge who implements Congress’s plain statutory instructions limits, by definition, the authority 
of the judiciary.  In such cases, the textualist judge can simultaneously fulfill textualism’s 
mandate that the judge act as a faithful agent of Congress, based on enacted statutory text, and 
textualism’s urge to constrain both judicial discretion and judicial authority.  Accordingly, it is 
not surprising to find, as demonstrated above, that the Court’s textualists have regularly relied 
strictly on statutory text in construing jurisdiction-ousting statutes.332  
Matters are more complicated for the textualist judge when Congress enacts a statute with 
plain text purporting to confer expansive jurisdiction on the courts.  A methodologically faithful 
textualist judge presumably would construe it according to its plain terms, declining to create 
implicit exceptions to the statutory grant of authority.  After all, textualism’s “general principle 
that texts should be taken at face value—with no implied extensions of specific texts or 
exceptions to general ones”333 seems quite specifically to enjoin the textualist judge from finding 
implicit limitations in broad statutory conferrals of jurisdiction.  Such an approach both ensures 
faithful agency and advances the general textualist preference to construe congressional 
                                                
329  See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 9, at 22.
330  542 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
331  Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1471 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 
U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).  Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.
332  See supra Part III.B.
333  Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 65, at 424–25.
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decisions to create rule-like directives.334  As demonstrated above, however, when called upon to 
construe broad jurisdictional grants, the textualist’s desire to be a faithful agent conflicts with the 
more generalized impulse to limit judicial authority.  Faithful application of broad, jurisdiction-
creating statutes, after all, results in a broader range of cases in which judges can exercise 
authority, notwithstanding what textualists like to describe as the “properly limited” role of the 
judiciary in our democratic system.  Textualists have struggled with jurisdiction-conferring 
statutes because such statutes reveal a fundamental tension in the theoretical underpinnings of 
their methodology.  The discussion above demonstrates that textualists have often resolved this 
tension by sacrificing their faithful agency to Congress’s plain instructions, in the name of 
restricting judicial authority.  
Of course, in interpreting jurisdiction-conferring statutes implicitly to limit judicial 
authority, textualists arguably condone the sort of judicial lawmaking that reliance on plain text 
is supposed to constrain.  After all, as Justice Scalia has warned, judges freed from the
constraining effect of text might be tempted to “pursue their own objectives and desires, 
extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.”335  But 
textualist judges appear to have concluded that this is sometimes a risk worth accepting, because 
the result of such atextual interpretation is to prevent the courts from acting at all in some range 
of cases otherwise embraced by the plain terms of the jurisdictional grant.  In these cases, the 
impulse to limit judicial involvement altogether has prevailed over the impulse to limit judicial 
discretion in interpreting statutes.  Thus it is little surprise that cases in which textualist judges 
have offered atextual interpretations of jurisdictional statutes in recent years have involved 
statutes that purported to confer broad jurisdiction, rather than statutes that purported to deprive 
the courts of jurisdiction that they previously had exercised.  
2.  Other Explanations
                                                
334  See Nelson, What is Textualism, supra note 70, at 401; cf. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, supra note 10, 
at 79 (concluding that the interest in reducing the costs of judicial decision-making and of legal uncertainty argue in 
favor of formalist, rule-based approaches to interpretation).
335  Scalia, supra note 9, at 18.  Daniel Meltzer has argued that “if one embraces a lawmaking role for courts in 
rounding out the edges of jurisdictional enactments, that role will inevitably involve courts in making decisions that 
might be variously characterized as substantive, controversial, value-laden, or political.”  Meltzer, Jurisdiction and 
Discretion Revisited, supra note 56, at 1903.  This obviously is at odds with the textualist view of judging.
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To be sure, there are other plausible explanations for the account provided here of 
textualists’ interpretation of jurisdictional statutes.  Specifically, I consider the extent to which 
the constraint of precedent, concerns for federalism or separation of powers, and results-oriented 
interpretation might account for the textualists’ approach to jurisdictional statutes.  I conclude, 
however, that each of these explanations ultimately is not as convincing as the account provided 
above, at least if textualists’ claims about their methodology are to retain any normative force.
a.  The Constraint of Precedent
One possibility is the constraining force of precedent, which the Court has long found to 
be particularly potent in cases involving statutory interpretation.336  After all, many of the recent 
decisions finding implicit exceptions to broad statutory grants of jurisdiction rely at least in part 
on older cases that initially carved out such exceptions.  This certainly is the case for the well-
pleaded complaint rule337 and the domestic-relations338 and probate339 exceptions to the diversity 
jurisdiction.340  But stare decisis cannot fully explain the account developed here, because 
textualists have been willing to take a narrow view of the constraining force of precedent when 
the result would be to reduce, rather than expand, the federal courts’ jurisdiction.  In Finley v. 
United States,341 for example, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court declined to apply the 
generous approach to federal-court jurisdiction that United Mine Workers v. Gibbs342 had applied 
to a case involving pendent-claim jurisdiction.  In addition, the textualists have been willing to 
recognize implicit exceptions to federal jurisdiction even in cases for which there was no 
obviously applicable prior case law construing the jurisdictional statute at issue.343  At best, the 
                                                
336  See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–173 (1989) (“Considerations of stare decisis 
have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional 
interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.”).
337  See Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 830 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127–128 
(1974)).  Phillips Petroleum, in turn, relied on the Court’s earlier decision in Mottley.  See 415 U.S. at 128.
338  See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 693–97 (discussing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1859)).
339  See Marshall, 126 S. Ct. at 11746–48  (discussing Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946)).
340  It is true, as well, for the complete diversity rule, which is judicially created.  See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 
(3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
341  490 U.S. 545 (1989).
342  383 U.S. 715 (1966).
343  See, e.g., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2810–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (interpreting the recently enacted Detainee 
Treatment Act); Altmann, 541 U.S. 716–31 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (considering whether Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act applies retroactively).
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constraint of precedent can be only a partial explanation for the textualists’ selective application 
of textualist approaches to jurisdictional statutes. 
b.  Federalism and Separation-of-Powers Concerns
Another possible explanation for the selective application of textualist methodology to 
jurisdictional statutes flows from the courts’ long-standing tendency to view jurisdictional 
statutes as sui generis.  The exercise of jurisdiction often implicates federalism344 and separation-
of-powers concerns,345 and for these reasons courts346 and commentators347 have suggested that 
conventional approaches to statutory interpretation might not apply—or not apply in their normal 
fashion—to jurisdictional statutes.  These concerns have led courts to apply various canons of 
construction and judicially developed presumptions to limit the exercise of judicial power. 
There is little doubt that these separation-of-powers and federalism concerns have played 
an important role in judicial interpretation of jurisdictional statutes.  At least since Marbury v. 
Madison,348 the courts have been acutely aware of the conflict of interest inherent in courts’ 
interpreting of statutes that define the scope of their own power.  With regard to federalism, the 
Court has frequently insisted that “[d]ue regard for the rightful independence of state 
governments . . . requires that [federal courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the 
precise limits which the statute has defined.”349  These twin concerns—the concern about judicial 
aggrandizement and the desire to promote judicial federalism—have led the Court, albeit 
                                                
344  See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 7, at 581 (“[F]ederalism and comity concerns have been 
critical to the exercise of discretion in the federal courts and should remain so.”).
345  See id. at 574 (“[Q]uestions of jurisdiction are of special concern to the courts because they intimately affect the 
courts’ relations with each other as well as with the other branches of government.  Therefore the continued 
existence of measured authority to decline jurisdiction does not endanger, but rather protects, the principle of 
separation of powers”).; Debra Lyn Bassett, Statutory Interpretation in the Context of Federal Jurisdiction, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 52, 53 (arguing that “separation-of-powers principles impose exceptional interpretive constraints on 
federal courts’ constructions of their own judicial power”).
346  See, e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941).
347  See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 345, at 53 (arguing that “the context of federal jurisdiction raises distinctive 
statutory interpretation issues”).
348  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804) (holding that 
plaintiff had not waived right to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of federal court in which he had filed the 
suit). 
349  Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) (quoted in Finley, 490 U.S. at 553, and Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. 
v. Henson, 533 U.S. 28, 42 (2002)).
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erratically, to insist that it should refrain from reading jurisdictional statutes “broadly”350 and 
instead should “strictly constru[e]” them.351    
Such canons and presumptions help to explain a general reluctance to find federal-court 
jurisdiction in any case, and also explain the textualists’ insistence on strict construction of 
jurisdiction-ousting statutes.  They arguably provide a basis for the domestic-relations and 
probate exceptions to the diversity jurisdiction, as those are areas traditionally considered within 
the cognizance of the states.352  They might also justify abstention in cases such as Tenet v. 
Doe,353 which involved a claim seeking review of executive branch actions implicating national 
security.  Indeed, they may even lend support to a general presumption against the exercise of 
jurisdiction.  But these canons and presumptions, which perhaps account in part both for the 
textualists’ strict construction of jurisdiction-ousting statutes and for their willingness to read 
atextually statutes purporting to confer expansive jurisdiction, stand in uneasy tension with 
textualists’ own claims about the importance of ensuring that courts remain faithful agents of 
Congress.  Although there may be powerful reasons for courts to be reluctant to find that 
Congress has conferred jurisdiction, a presumption against jurisdiction—whether enforced 
because of federalism concerns, separation-of-powers concerns, or other reasons—is in serious 
tension with the essential textualist claims about the judicial role in statutory interpretation, at 
least when the statute at issue does not, on its face, admit of exceptions.  Federalism and 
separation-of-powers concerns may indeed provide powerful justifications for the creation of 
judicially implied exceptions to broad jurisdictional grants, but such departures from statutory 
language do not seem faithful—to use some of the textualists’ favorite bromides—to the “precise 
limits” that the relevant statute “has defined.”354  
This is not to say that attention to federalism and separation-of-powers concerns is 
irreconcilable with textualism.  To the contrary, they tend to go hand in hand when Congress has 
enacted a statute that limits the federal courts’ jurisdiction or divests them of jurisdiction 
outright.  But when Congress purports to confer jurisdiction to the limits permitted under Article 
                                                
350  Finley, 490 U.S. at 549.
351  Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 U.S. at 357 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 
313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941)).
352  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
353  92 U.S. 105 (1876).
354  Healy, 292 U.S. at 270.
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III, reliance on federalism and separation-of-powers based presumptions substantially diminishes 
the force and purity of textualism, which inhere in the courts’ treating the plain text of legislative 
enactments as the only authoritative statement of statutory meaning.  Indeed, Justice Scalia 
himself has made this very argument.  He has professed to be generally skeptical of 
“presumptions and rules of construction that load the dice for or against a particular result,” 
because they not only “increase the unpredictability, if not the arbitrariness, of judicial 
decisions” but are also arguably beyond the authority of the courts to impose.355  It may well be 
true that such presumptions make statutory interpretation more rule-based356—which produces 
virtues of its own357—but they are not virtues that flow necessarily from a theory of faithful 
agency based on the statutory text.358  Concerns about comity and the separation of powers, in 
other words, might provide powerful justifications for the approach that the Court’s textualist 
Justices have taken to jurisdictional statutes.  But these justifications are in substantial tension 
with textualists’ claims about faithful agency as the ordering principle of the judicial role.  
c.  Results-Oriented Interpretation
Yet another possible explanation for the selective application of textualist methodology 
to jurisdictional statutes is the realist critique that Justices are results-oriented.  Many assert that 
                                                
355  Scalia, supra note 9, at 27–29.  Justice Scalia has also insisted that a “text should not be construed strictly,” but 
rather should “be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”  Id. at 22.  On the other hand, Justice 
Scalia has applied clear-statement rules in order to effectuate federalism norms, see, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 
U.S. 223, 233 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), and to enforce structural protections for individual rights, see Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 574 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
356  See Grable, 545 U.S. at 321 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Jurisdictional rules should be clear.”); Nelson, What is 
Textualism, supra note 70, at 383–98, 402 (“Faced with uncertainty about how rule-like Congress meant a particular 
directive to be, textualists may tend to resolve their doubts in a way that shifts fewer important decisions from 
politically accountable members of Congress to politically insulated courts.”).  Of course, one could just as easily 
follow a competing rule—such as a presumption in favor of jurisdiction when granted—to achieve the same benefits
of rules-based decision-making.
357  See, e.g., SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 87, at 51–52; Sullivan, supra note 87, at 57–69; cf. 
David Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 925 (1992) (arguing that 
the interpretive canons that “have played the most significant role in the process of construction are those that . . . 
emphasize the importance of not changing existing understandings any more than is needed to implement the 
statutory objective,” and that the “judicial tendency to favor continuity over change is, on the whole, a desirable 
one”). 
358  See Manning, Non-delegation Doctrine, supra note 68, at 707–19.
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the Court has a general antipathy to litigation,359 to plaintiffs or particular rights that they 
assert,360 or to particular classes of cases, such as those within diversity jurisdiction.361  It is 
possible, for example, that the Court’s textualists have been particularly stingy in their 
constructions of the habeas statute because of their views about the likely substantive merits of 
habeas claims.  It is difficult to substantiate such an account, however, as the Court’s opinions 
rarely will invoke such a ground for decision.  In any event, even if such hostility is a motivating 
force for the textualist drive to limit federal court jurisdiction, it is largely consistent with the 
judicial-constraint account provided here. The desire to trim the courts’ docket of cases, most of 
which (on this account) are unwanted, is no different in practical effect than the desire to limit 
judicial authority because of concerns about the judicial role in a democratic system.362
B.  Implications for Textualism
In the end, it is difficult to explain the approach of the Court’s self-professed textualists 
to jurisdictional statutes without returning to textualism’s more general view about the exercise 
of judicial authority.  The textualist Justices’ selective application of their chosen methodology 
to jurisdictional statutes suggests that textualism, at least in practice, has been less about fidelity 
to Congress’s legislative supremacy and more about constraining judicial authority.  
If this account is correct, it reveals something about the core defenses of textualism.  
Textualists have not been shy about insisting that non-textualist approaches to statutory 
interpretation are inconsistent not only with the theory of faithful agency, but also with 
legislative supremacy, the concept of law, and democracy itself.363  But the jurisdictional context 
reveals that these claims are at best overblown and at worst hypocritical.  If self-professed 
textualist judges can read broad jurisdictional statutes according to something other than their 
                                                
359  See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme of the 
Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006); Weinberg, supra note 112, at 1420–22; Marc 
Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L. REV. 633 (1994).
360  See Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy Champion for Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The United States in Parens 
Patriae, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 111 (1997).
361  See Freer, The Cauldron Boils, supra note 288, at 60; Redish, Abstention, supra note 6, at 104 (describing 
judicially created exceptions to diversity jurisdiction as thinly-veiled attacks on the diversity jurisdiction).
362  If the hostility account is correct, however, it undermines the claims of textualists, who argue that the approach 
will cabin judges’ discretion to act politically.  If judges can defy Congress’s instructions—expressed plainly, in 
duly enacted statutory text—in order to achieve results that they prefer, then textualism’s constraining influence is 
substantially diminished.
363  See Scalia, supra note 9, at 17.
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plain language, then perhaps they should temper their general insistence that government by 
something other than the plain language of legislative enactments is “tyrannical.”364
Yet this account is not necessarily fatal for textualism as a methodology of statutory 
interpretation.  Even if textualism cannot always deliver on its promise of courts acting as 
faithful agents of the legislature, it still holds a powerful normative appeal as a way to 
operationalize a theory of judicial restraint.365  Indeed, the jurisdictional context suggests that the 
textualist project has been more about limiting the judicial role than about faithful agency.  But 
the account developed here should force defenders of textualism to acknowledge that, at least 
sometimes, the methodology does no better than other approaches to statutory interpretation at 
ensuring the faithful agency of the courts.  It may well be that textualism nevertheless is 
defensible, but its proponents must be willing to argue that the desire to limit judicial authority is 
a sufficiently compelling end that the sacrifice to the notion of faithful agency is justified.366  
The account presented here also has implications for textualists’ claims that their 
approach is superior to others at constraining judicial mischief.367  Justice Scalia, for example, 
has warned that the threat of non-textualist approaches to statutory interpretation is that “under 
the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law 
judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking 
proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.”368  Of course, whether textualism 
                                                
364  Id.
365  See Smith, supra note 23, at 1475.
366  The account provided here may, however, suggest that textualism is misguided as a method for construing 
jurisdictional statutes.  Indeed, the current collection of jurisdictional statutes provides a cautionary tale for any 
judge committed to textualism.  Many are poorly drafted and, if read literally, would produce results that Congress 
could not plausibly have intended.  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About 
Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309 (2001) (discussing apparent error in 28 U.S.C. § 1391).  
Others when read literally are in obvious tension with Article III.  See, e.g., Douglas D. McFarland, The 
Unconstitutional Stub of Section 1441(c), 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059 (1993).  As a result, several commentators have 
urged a more sympathetic reading of jurisdictional statutes, with an unapologetically more robust role for judges in 
the crafting of the jurisdictional regime.  See Meltzer, Judicial Passivity, supra note 56, at 396 (“[N]ot only is it 
unrealistic to expect Congress to be able to resolve all issues up front in statutory text, but there are many instances 
in which a congressional effort to do so is likely to be less successful than leaving matters to be worked out by
judicial decision.”); Siegel, supra, at 348–58, 366; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 1367 and All That: Recodifying Federal 
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 53, 57–58 (1998); Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 154–
60.
367  See supra, Part II.
368  Scalia, supra note 9, at 17–18; see id. at 18 (calling “legislative intent” a “handy cover for judicial intent”); id. at 
21 (calling purposivism “an invitation to judicial lawmaking”).  
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succeeds more generally as a constraining device is a question of substantial controversy,369 as 
the textualists’ claims are not easily testable without choosing some baseline—such as text, 
intent, or purpose, which of course assumes the conclusion—from which to measure deviation.  
But in the jurisdictional context, one could at least argue that the textualists’ claims or constraint 
are vindicated in practice.  Indeed, in one sense, a consistently applied presumption against 
jurisdiction might well help to reduce judicial discretion, in the sense that judges who are less 
likely to act at all are, a fortiori, less likely to act instrumentally.  
This, however, is a difficult claim to sustain.  First, the contention that there is little room 
for judicial mischief when judges conclude that they lack jurisdiction to proceed ignores the 
threshold interpretive question—whether Congress has, in fact, stripped the courts of jurisdiction 
to act.  If the jurisdictional statute is more properly read to authorize jurisdiction—either because 
the language is susceptible to more than one interpretation, because Congress did not intend to 
divest the courts of jurisdiction, or for some other reason—then the court’s refusal to entertain an 
action itself might amount to a form of judicial mischief.  Second, the textualist judges’ 
willingness to abstain from exercising jurisdiction that Congress appears, in light of the plain text 
of an enactment, to have conferred seems quite similar to the tendency that textualists regularly 
decry—the inclination of judges to substitute their will for that of Congress.  
To be sure, the aim of such an interpretive approach may well be in the service of judicial 
minimalism.  But that does not mean that it is not a form of judicial willfulness.  In some cases, 
Congress plausibly has attempted to confer jurisdiction in order to promote some policy goal by 
using the tool of litigation, and judicial refusal to participate frustrates the legislative judgment.  
And even if one assumes that judicial abstention is always policy-neutral, it is at least 
inconsistent with the notion of faithful agency and legislative supremacy.  The merits of those 
ideas may well be debatable.370  But if textualists continue to assert that their approach is 
uniquely consistent with faithful agency and legislative supremacy, it is fair to evaluate textualist 
judges’ actual decision-making according to the extent to which it advances them.
C.  Implications for the Congressional-Control Model of Federal Jurisdiction
                                                
369  See supra at note 88 and accompanying text.
370  See supra Part I.B.
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Chief Justice Marshall famously argued that the federal courts “have no more right to 
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one 
or the other would be treason to the constitution.”371  But the account developed above suggests 
that in practice, textualist judges have been substantially more willing “to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction which is given” than “to usurp that which is not.”  
The long-standing debate about Congress’s power to control the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts is unlikely to be resolved any time soon.  But because textualism—particularly as 
applied in practice—has been largely about the courts’ relationship to Congress, the rise of 
textualism is important to the ongoing debate, at least as a positive matter.372  The tendency of 
the Court’s textualists to construe jurisdiction-ousting statutes more strictly than jurisdiction-
conferring statutes suggests that although the textualists have accepted the strong congressional-
control model for jurisdiction-stripping, they see a substantially more robust role for the federal 
courts on the abstention side of the debate.  And any consideration of Congress’s power to 
control the jurisdiction of the federal courts must account for the Supreme Court’s active role in 
effectively limiting the jurisdiction of those courts.373  At least as a positive matter, David 
Shapiro’s view that courts ought to exercise discretion in deciding whether there should be 
jurisdiction in a particular case—and not Redish’s visions of absolute legislative supremacy—
appears to have prevailed.374    
To be sure, virtually all of the cases discussed above relate to congressional control over 
lower-court jurisdiction; Congress has rarely put the Court squarely to the test of addressing the 
mandatory scope of its appellate jurisdiction or the extent of Congress’s power under the 
                                                
371  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
372  In offering thoughts about the implications of textualism in practice, I take to heart Cass Sunstein’s admonition 
that normative questions about the proper judicial role in statutory interpretation cannot be comprehensively 
addressed without attention to pragmatic questions.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended 
Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636 (1999); cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, Judicial Passivity, supra note 56, at 382–83:  
(arguing that “simple appeals to democracy or structure set forth in a constitution (federal or state) for the enactment 
of legislation cannot itself answer the question of the appropriate judicial role”).
373  See Weinberg, supra note 112, at 1408–09 (“The Supreme Court is by far the more active source of door-closing 
rules in constitutional and other federal cases. . . .  [T]he Court’s door-closing jurisprudence must, however 
imperfectly, be relevant to any consideration of Congress’s door-closing powers.”). 
374  See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 7, at 574–75 (“[A]s experience and tradition teach, the 
question whether a court must exercise jurisdiction and resolve a controversy on its merits is difficult, if not 
impossible, to answer in gross. And the courts are functionally better adapted to engage in the necessary fine tuning 
than is the legislature.”).
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Exceptions Clause,375 and any suggestion about how the Court’s textualists would respond is 
mere speculation.376  But the textualists’ approach to jurisdictional statutes more generally 
suggests that their concern about limiting federal judicial power would lead most textualists to 
advance a strong congressional-control model for the Exceptions Clause, as well.  
We need not speculate, however, about the textualists’ views about the power of the 
courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction that Congress ostensibly has granted.  As demonstrated 
above, although the rise of textualism has had a pronounced effect on the strictness with which 
the Court’s textualists interpret jurisdiction-ousting statutes, the Court’s textualists have not 
similarly insisted consistently on strict obeisance to Congress’s instructions in statutes conferring 
expansive jurisdiction.  Notwithstanding the rise of textualism—or perhaps because of it—
Congress’s power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it appears, turns at least in part 
on Congress’s willingness to further the project of limiting judicial authority.  
CONCLUSION
Textualists have in many respects redefined the debate about the appropriate judicial role 
in matters of statutory interpretation.  In so doing, they have also shaped the debate about the 
proper relationship between Congress and the federal courts.  Although textualists speak with 
confidence about the courts’ role as faithful agents of Congress, application of the approach in 
practice to jurisdictional statutes has suggested that the textualist view of the judiciary’s 
relationship to Congress is somewhat more ambivalent.  The notion of faithful agency, it turns 
out, risks increasing judicial authority, when Congress seeks to confer it; but textualism, in both 
theory and practice, has been largely focused on limiting judicial authority.  And when faithful 
agency has conflicted with the urge to limit judicial power, the latter has prevailed.  
As a positive matter, this suggests that the answer to the question of the extent of 
Congress’s control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts varies depending on whether 
                                                
375  In Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996), the Court avoided resolving whether AEDPA’s limits on the Court’s 
power to review certain lower-court judgments deprived the Court of appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III.  
The Court concluded that Congress had not purported to strip the Supreme Court of its “original” jurisdiction to 
grant habeas petitions, and thus that Congress had not fully deprived the Court of jurisdiction to consider petitions 
for habeas corpus.  Id. at 658–61 (discussing Ex Parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85 (1869)).  
376  Justice Scalia offered his most forceful endorsement of the congressional-control model in a case involving a 
congressional limitation on the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.  See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 611–15 
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Congress seeks to grant authority to the federal courts or instead to deprive them of it.  This is 
certainly not an indefensible view of the long-standing question of the congressional role in 
crafting a jurisdictional regime.  But it is not the view that one might expect as the product of 
strict adherence to textualism, with its insistence on the faithful-agent model of the courts.  If 
indeed textualism is more about constraining judicial authority than it is about faithful agency, its 
proponents should develop a normative defense of the approach that acknowledges those 
objectives and accounts for the attendant theoretical costs.  A richer account of textualism can 
only advance the project of understanding the courts’ relationship to Congress, and in so doing 
can help us to develop a fuller account of the extent of Congress’s authority to control the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Until then, we must take textualists’ most sweeping claims 
with a grain of salt.
